Transcript
Interview with RT, PIK and Ekho Moskvy
English includes full house translations. Review is pending; untranslated passages and selected digest glosses remain labelled.
| Русский | English |
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| Е.Котрикадзе: Спасибо большое, Дмитрий Анатольевич, что Вы согласились ответить на наши вопросы, в том числе вопросы грузинского телеканала «ПИК». Август 2008 года, российско-грузинская война, это произошло три года назад, но последствия её до сих пор вполне ощутимы, несмотря на то что она продлилась всего пять дней. Мы сейчас находимся в Сочи, отсюда Грузия всего в нескольких километрах, до Абхазии рукой подать, но я не могу поехать в Абхазию, потому что меня просто не пропустят, я грузинка, и не пропустят меня российские пограничники. В таком же положении оказались 500 тысяч беженцев, которые, к сожалению, не могут попасть в свои дома. Как бы Вы, Дмитрий Анатольевич, могли бы помочь этим людям? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Thank you very much, Dmitry Anatolyevich, for agreeing to answer our questions, including questions from the Georgian television channel 'PIK'. August 2008 of the year, the Russian-Georgian war, this happened three years ago, but its consequences are still quite tangible, despite the fact that it lasted only five days. We are currently in Sochi, from here Georgia is just a few kilometers away, Abkhazia is within reach, but I cannot go to Abkhazia because I simply will not be allowed to enter; I am Georgian, and Russian border guards will not let me in. People in the same situation were 500 thousand refugees, who, unfortunately, cannot reach their homes. How could you, Dmitry Anatolyevich, help these people? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Mr President, thank you very much for agreeing to answer our questions, including those from the Georgian PIK TV network. August 2008, the Russia-Georgia war — that was three years ago, but its consequences are still felt today, even though that war only lasted for five days. Right now, we are in Sochi, and Georgia is just a few kilometres away: Abkhazia is right across the border from here. But I cannot go to Abkhazia because I will be simply denied entry. I am Georgian, and it will be Russian border guards who will stop me. Five hundred thousand refugees have found themselves in a similar situation, being unable to return to their homes. How could you help those people? |
| Д.Медведев: Я думаю, что помочь им можно, но для этого нужно прежде всего сделать так, чтобы наконец воцарился мир и чтобы абхазы, грузины, осетины могли находиться в нормальном полноценном диалоге. И тогда можно разрешить самые сложные вопросы: и вопросы беженцев, и вопросы проезда, пролёта, потому что это всё прикладные вещи применительно к тому конфликту, который, к сожалению, произошёл практически в эти же даты в 2008 году. Поэтому нормальная дипломатическая работа, переговоры и возможность слышать друг друга – вот что необходимо для того, чтобы разрешить эти проблемы. Ну и плюс, конечно, признание реалий, признание тех реалий, которые сложились в регионе в результате той авантюры, которая случилась в 2008 году. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I think that one can help them, but for this one must above all bring it about that peace finally reigns, and that Abkhaz, Georgians, and Ossetians can be in a normal, full dialogue. And then one can resolve the most difficult questions: both the questions of refugees and the questions of passage and overflight, because these are all applied matters relative to the conflict that, unfortunately, occurred on practically these same dates in 2008. So normal diplomatic work, negotiations, and the possibility of hearing one another — that is what is necessary in order to resolve these problems. And plus, of course, recognition of the realities, recognition of those realities that took shape in the region as a result of the reckless venture that happened in 2008. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Давайте тогда вернёмся к событиям 2008 года. Тогда, в 2008-м, Вы встречались с Президентом Грузии Михаилом Саакашвили, произошло это в Петербурге. Тогда сложилось такое ощущение, в Тбилиси и в Москве, что достигнут некий консенсус, что этот конфликт не дойдёт до «горячей точки». Ощущение такое было, повторяю, и в Москве, и в Тбилиси. Вы не могли бы рассказать, Вы тогда договорились о чём‑то с Президентом Грузии? Нужно сделать так, чтобы наконец воцарился мир и чтобы абхазы, грузины, осетины могли находиться в нормальном полноценном диалоге. И тогда можно разрешить самые сложные вопросы. Нормальная дипломатическая работа, переговоры и возможность слышать друг друга – вот что необходимо для того, чтобы решить проблемы. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Let's then return to the events of 2008 of the year. Then, in 2008-st, you met with the President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, this happened in St. Petersburg. Then it seemed, in Tbilisi and in Moscow, that some consensus was reached, that this conflict would not reach a 'hot point'. The feeling was such, I repeat, both in Moscow and in Tbilisi. Could you tell us, did you agree on something with the President of Georgia then? We need to make sure that peace finally prevails and that Abkhazians, Georgians, and Ossetians can engage in a normal, full-fledged dialogue. Then the most difficult issues can be resolved. Normal diplomatic work, negotiations, and the ability to hear each other – that is what is necessary to solve problems. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Then let us go back to the events of 2008. Back then, you met with the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. Your meeting took place in St Petersburg. And there was an impression at that point, both in Tbilisi and in Moscow, that we had arrived at some sort of an accord, and the dispute would not be allowed to boil over into an armed conflict. And I reiterate that this feeling was present both in Moscow and in Tbilisi. Could you tell us whether you managed to agree on anything with the Georgian president back then? |
| 3 The Broken Diplomacy Before the War | |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, Екатерина, у меня тоже было такое ощущение. У меня до сих пор это в памяти, как мы встретились первый раз с Президентом Саакашвили. Это было в Петербурге, мы встретились в Константиновском дворце, он пришёл, я ему сказал буквально следующую фразу: «Вы знаете, есть очень много проблем сейчас в регионе, в Грузии, с непризнанными территориальными образованиями. Но я могу Вас заверить как новый Президент Российской Федерации, что я сделаю всё для того, чтобы Вы постарались найти какие‑то компромиссы, которые устроят всех, которые в конечном счёте способствовали бы реинтеграции пространства Грузии». Вот что дословно я ему сказал. «Если, конечно, это будет привлекательно для всех, кто находится в переговорах». Я услышал на это: да, конечно, мы готовы работать. И у меня тоже сложилось впечатление, что можно если не новую страницу открыть, то, во всяком случае, постараться найти какие‑то новые, нестандартные подходы, но самое главное – регулярно общаться. Что происходило дальше? Мы общались, разговаривали, и, насколько я помню, последний раз наша встреча состоялась в Астане. В чём она заключалась? Мы тогда договорились о том, что сядем и по‑серьёзному поговорим. Где? А вот здесь, в Сочи. Я ему сказал: «Приезжайте в Сочи, мы спокойно поговорим обо всех проблемах». Потому что он начал перечислять свои какие‑то сложности или своё видение ситуации, я ему сказал о российском видении. Но с учётом того, что это было на праздновании годовщины Астаны, я ему сказал: «Приезжайте в Россию». Он сказал: «Хорошо. Я готов это сделать». Могу Вам сказать откровенно, я после этого месяц проверял, есть ли от нашего грузинского партнёра какая‑то информация. Её не было. Но зато в Грузию в этот период зачастили, как принято говорить было в советские времена, эмиссары из‑за океана. И для меня достаточно очевидным моментом (я потом это анализировал, естественно, неоднократно) был визит в тот период Государственного секретаря Соединённых Штатов Кондолизы Райс. После этого мой коллега просто ушёл со связи, он перестал общаться, перестал писать, перестал звонить, выходить на связь. По всей вероятности, возникли новые планы, и они были реализованы. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, Yekaterina, I had the same feeling too. It is still in my memory, how we met for the first time with President Saakashvili. This was in St. Petersburg; we met in the Constantine Palace; he came, and I said to him literally the following phrase: "You know, there are a great many problems now in the region, in Georgia, with the unrecognized territorial formations. But I can assure you, as the new President of the Russian Federation, that I will do everything so that you try to find some compromises that will suit everyone, that would in the final account contribute to the reintegration of the space of Georgia." That is what I said to him word for word. "If, of course, this is attractive to everyone who is in the negotiations." I heard in reply: yes, of course, we are ready to work. And I too formed the impression that one could, if not open a new page, then in any case try to find some new, nonstandard approaches, but the most important thing was to communicate regularly. What happened further? We communicated, we talked, and, so far as I remember, our last meeting took place in Astana. What did it consist of? We agreed then that we would sit down and talk seriously. Where? Right here, in Sochi. I told him: "Come to Sochi; we will calmly talk about all the problems." Because he began to list some difficulties of his, or his vision of the situation, and I told him the Russian vision. But taking into account that this was at the celebration of the anniversary of Astana, I told him: "Come to Russia." He said: "Good. I am ready to do this." I can tell you frankly that after this I spent a month checking whether there was any information from our Georgian partner. There was none. But in that period emissaries from across the ocean began, as it was customary to say in Soviet times, to visit Georgia frequently. And for me a sufficiently obvious moment (I analyzed this afterward, naturally, more than once) was the visit in that period of the Secretary of State of the United States, Condoleezza Rice. After that my colleague simply went off the line; he stopped communicating, stopped writing, stopped calling, stopped getting in touch. In all probability new plans arose, and they were carried out. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, правильно ли я Вас понял, что Вы считаете теперь, что визит Госсекретаря США – это было подталкивание Президента Саакашвили к развязыванию конфликта, что Соединённые Штаты специально двигали в эту сторону? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, did I understand you correctly that you now believe that the visit of the US Secretary of State was pushing President Saakashvili towards launching the conflict, that the United States specifically pushed in that direction? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, am I correct to assume that, the way you see it, that visit by the US Secretary of State was meant to urge President Saakashvili into war? Do you think the United States was deliberately encouraging Georgia to pursue a conflict? |
| Д.Медведев: Нет, я так не считаю, потому что Соединённые Штаты – всё‑таки очень крупная страна, которая возглавляется прагматичными людьми. Но в политике очень важны оттенки и нюансы. Я как‑то говорил, что, когда я, ещё будучи Руководителем Администрации Президента, приехал в Белый дом и встречался, кстати, с той же самой Конди и с руководителем аппарата Президента, пришёл Джордж Буш. Как у них принято: привет – привет. Зашёл. Первое, что он мне сказал: «А Миша Саакашвили хороший парень?» Я говорю: «Господин Президент, я не знаю, я с ним не знаком, может быть, познакомлюсь». К сожалению, его слова оказались в плохом смысле пророческими. Это была первая фраза, подчёркиваю, которую я услышал в личном общении от Джорджа Буша. Так вот я не считаю, что американцы подталкивали грузинского руководителя к агрессии. Но я думаю, что определённые нюансы, определённые акценты, слова о том, что пора восстановить конституционный порядок, пора действовать более решительно, могли возбудить совершенно очевидные надежды, что при возникновении любого конфликта «американцы нас не бросят, они вступятся, в конце концов они войну устроят с русскими». Поэтому я всё‑таки связываю этот визит и последующие события, как и моё последующее телефонное общение с главой Белого дома, ну и потом уже личное общение. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: No, I do not think so, because the United States is all the same a very large country, headed by pragmatic people. But in politics shades and nuances are very important. I once said that when I, still being Head of the Presidential Administration, arrived at the White House and met, by the way, that same Condi and the head of the President's staff, George Bush came in. As is their custom: hello, hello. He came in. The first thing he said to me was: "And is Misha Saakashvili a good guy?" I say: "Mr. President, I do not know; I am not acquainted with him; perhaps I will make his acquaintance." Unfortunately his words proved prophetic in a bad sense. This was the first phrase, I stress, that I heard in personal conversation from George Bush. So I do not consider that the Americans pushed the Georgian leader toward aggression. But I think that certain nuances, certain accents, words to the effect that it was time to restore constitutional order, time to act more decisively, could arouse entirely obvious hopes that if any conflict arose "the Americans will not abandon us, they will step in, in the end they will start a war with the Russians." So I do all the same connect this visit and the subsequent events, as I do my subsequent telephone contact with the head of the White House, and then personal contact too. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Значит, зелёного света не было? Это фраза, которую часто повторяют, анализируя войну 2008 года, всё время говорят: наверное, был зелёный свет из Вашингтона. Я не считаю, что американцы подталкивали грузинского руководителя к агрессии. Но я думаю, что определённые нюансы, определённые акценты, слова могли возбудить надежды, что при возникновении любого конфликта «американцы нас не бросят. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: So there was no green light? This is a phrase that is often repeated when analyzing the war of 2008 of the year; people always say: perhaps there was a green light from Washington. I do not believe that Americans pushed the Georgian leader towards aggression. But I think that certain nuances, certain accents, words could have aroused hopes that in the event of any conflict 'the Americans will not abandon us'. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: So there was no ‘green light’ from the White House? This is a phrase they often repeat when analysing the war of 2008: “It must have been greenlighted by Washington.” |
| 2 US Encouragement and the "Green Light" Question | |
| Д.Медведев: Для того чтобы это сказать, нужно иметь как минимум официальные или агентурные данные. У меня их нет. Но мы все умеем анализировать. После визита Кондолизы Райс мой коллега общаться перестал. Может быть, это случайное совпадение. Но у меня есть практически полная уверенность в том, что в этот момент возник план по соответствующей авантюре, которая и случилась в августе. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: In order to say this, one needs at least official or agent-source data. I do not have them. But we all know how to analyze. After Condoleezza Rice's visit my colleague stopped communicating. Perhaps this is a chance coincidence. But I have practically complete confidence that at that moment a plan arose for the corresponding reckless venture, which then happened in August. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, Президент Саакашвили говорит о том, что на самом деле Россия задолго до августа 2008 года готовилась к войне, в частности, цитирует тогдашнего Президента (Вашего предшественника) Владимира Путина о том, что «мы вам устроим Северный Кипр». Это цитата, по словам Саакашвили. Вы были в руководстве России, Вы можете подтвердить, что такие вещи обсуждались, или опровергнуть? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, President Saakashvili says that in fact Russia prepared for the war long before August 2008 year, in particular, quoting then-President (your predecessor) Vladimir Putin that 'we will set up Northern Cyprus for you'. This is a quote, according to Saakashvili. You were in the leadership of Russia, you can confirm that such things were discussed, or refute? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: President Saakashvili claims that Russia had been preparing for war long before August 2008. He cites your predecessor, then-president Vladimir Putin as saying, “We will show you some Northern Cyprus,” — that’s a quote, according to Saakashvili. You were part of the government at the time. Can you confirm or deny that such deliberations took place? |
| Д.Медведев: Чушь это всё собачья. Господин Саакашвили много чего говорит. Он вообще свою речь зачастую не контролирует. Естественно, ничего подобного не обсуждалось. А в руководстве страны я нахожусь уже практически больше 10 лет. Это первое. И второе. Вы знаете, конфликт никогда никому не нужен. Тот, кто скажет, что при помощи конфликта можно чего‑то решить, тот врёт. Конфликты ни к чему хорошему не приводили. Если бы удалось предотвратить этот конфликт, это было бы на пользу всем, прежде всего, конечно, на пользу Грузии. И то, что этого не случилось, к сожалению, большая трагедия. И ответственность за эту трагедию, к сожалению, на мой взгляд, несёт только один человек (просто так устроена государственная машина) – это Президент Грузии. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: That is all nonsense. Mr. Saakashvili says a great many things. He often does not control his speech at all. Naturally, nothing of the kind was discussed. And I have already been in the leadership of the country for practically more than 10 years. That is the first thing. And the second. You know, a conflict is never needed by anyone. Whoever says that something can be settled by means of a conflict is lying. Conflicts have never led to anything good. If this conflict had been prevented, it would have been to everyone's benefit, above all, of course, to Georgia's benefit. And that this did not happen is, unfortunately, a great tragedy. And responsibility for this tragedy is borne, unfortunately, in my view, by only one person — that is simply how the state machine is built — and that is the President of Georgia. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Дмитрий Анатольевич, но ведь в любом случае война – это в первую очередь поражение дипломатии. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Dmitry Anatolyevich, but in any case war is primarily the defeat of diplomacy. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: But in any case, Mr President, war represents a failure of diplomacy. ( |
| Д.Медведев: Точно. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Exactly. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Анализируя ситуацию спустя три года, что бы Вы сделали по‑другому? Что не смогла сделать Россия, чтобы предотвратить войну, избежать войны? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Analyzing the situation three years later, what would you have done differently? What could Russia not do to prevent the war, avoid the war? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: When interviewed by Alexei Venediktov, Mr Saakashvili told him that you were actually avoiding him during the summit in Astana. And that made it clear for him that a conflict was now unavoidable. |
| 1 The 2008 War as Saakashvili's Personal Catastrophe | |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, я могу прямо сказать, если бы я понимал, скажем, в июле, что в воспалённом мозгу господина Саакашвили зреют такие планы, может быть, я бы более жёстко с ним разговаривал, старался бы вытащить его из этой ситуации, которая сложилась у него там, в Россию, в третью страну, для того чтобы с ним поговорить, чтобы хотя бы отговорить его. Но этого, естественно, я не знал. Поэтому, когда всё это произошло, знаете, несмотря на то что мы понимали, что есть различного рода намерения силой восстановить территориальное единство страны, использовать войска, я думал, что это параноидальный сценарий, который никогда не будет реализован. Всегда же надеешься всё‑таки на то, что разум будет сильнее, чем аргументы такого порядка. Именно поэтому (я уже неоднократно об этом говорил) то, что произошло 8-го, было для меня удивительным, потому что я понимал, что тем самым Саакашвили лично растерзал своё Отечество. И вот это самое страшное для него и для грузинского народа. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I can say straight out: if I had understood, say in July, that such plans were ripening in Mr. Saakashvili's fevered brain, perhaps I would have talked with him more harshly, would have tried to pull him out of the situation that had taken shape for him there, into Russia, into a third country, in order to talk with him, in order at least to talk him out of it. But of this, of course, I knew nothing. So when all this happened, you know, despite our understanding that there were intentions of various kinds to restore the territorial unity of the country by force, to use troops, I thought this was a paranoid scenario that would never be carried out. One always hopes all the same that reason will be stronger than arguments of that order. That is precisely why — I have already spoken of this more than once — what happened on the 8th was astonishing to me, because I understood that by this Saakashvili had personally torn his Fatherland apart. And this is the most terrible thing for him and for the Georgian people. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: В интервью Алексею Венедиктову он сказал, что как раз во время вашей последней встречи в Астане Вы его избегали, и ему стало ясно, что конфликт неизбежен. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: In an interview with Alexey Venediktov he said that during your last meeting in Astana you avoided him, and it became clear to him that the conflict was inevitable. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Speaking of Saakashvili personally, and of Russia-Georgia relations after 2008, there has been no progress whatsoever; they are non-existent. And it is clear that to a certain extent, it’s been due to the personal attitudes of either leader. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili put forth an official proposal recently, advocating a dialogue with no preconditions. Why did you turn it down, considering that Saakashvili is a legitimately elected president of Georgia? |
| Д.Медведев: Ну что я могу сказать? Во‑первых, его трудно избегать, потому что он «липкий». И если он хочет пристать, то он пристанет как следует. Он ко мне подходил несколько раз. Мы с ним разговаривали, я отлично это помню, сидя в автобусе, гуляя по какому‑то парку. Я даже больше скажу. Мы потом пошли попить вечером чайку и по бокалу вина, и даже там мы сидели с ним на каком‑то диванчике и обсуждали, как встретиться. Поэтому это сказки, пусть они останутся на его совести, как и многое другое. 2008 года: они, в общем‑то, не развиваются вообще, их нет. При этом понятно, что в некоторой степени это зависело от каких‑то личных отношений лидеров. Президент Грузии Михаил Саакашвили недавно официально предложил диалог без предварительных условий. Почему Вы отвечаете отказом, если учесть, что Саакашвили является законно избранным Президентом этой страны? Конфликты ни к чему хорошему не приводили. Тот, кто скажет, что при помощи конфликта можно чего‑то решить, тот врёт. Предотвращение этого конфликта было бы на пользу всем, прежде всего Грузии. Ответственность за эту трагедию несёт только один человек – это Президент Грузии. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Well, what can I say? First, he is hard to avoid, because he is "sticky." And if he wants to attach himself, he will attach himself properly. He came up to me several times. We talked; I remember it perfectly, sitting on a bus, walking in some park. I will say even more. We then went in the evening to drink some tea and a glass of wine, and even there we sat with him on some little sofa and discussed how to meet. So these are fairy tales; let them remain on his conscience, like much else. Of 2008: they, on the whole, are not developing at all; they do not exist. At the same time it is clear that to some extent this depended on some personal relations of the leaders. The President of Georgia, Mikheil Saakashvili, recently officially proposed a dialogue without preconditions. Why do you answer with a refusal, given that Saakashvili is the lawfully elected President of that country? Conflicts have never led to anything good. Whoever says that something can be settled by means of a conflict is lying. Preventing this conflict would have been to everyone's benefit, above all Georgia's. Responsibility for this tragedy is borne by only one person — the President of Georgia. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Sophie Shevardnadze: Mr President, we actually have a whole bunch of questions on that subject. ( |
| 5 Limits of the Operation — Why Not Take Tbilisi | |
| Д.Медведев: Только потому, что Саакашвили совершил преступление по отношению к Российской Федерации и к её гражданам. По его указанию были убиты сотни наших граждан, включая наших миротворцев. Этого я ему никогда не прощу, и поэтому я с ним общаться не буду, хотя он периодически пытается подмигивать в различных международных коридорах и так далее. Со всеми другими – пожалуйста, никаких проблем я не вижу, мы можем общаться на любые темы в рамках, конечно, того международно-правового статуса, который сложился в регионе, и в рамках тех решений, очень тяжёлых и непростых для меня, которые я принимал. Но для меня он фигура нерукопожатная. Я понимаю, что он законно избранный Президент Грузии. Только грузинский народ может ставить ему оценки, выносить ему вердикты. В любом случае я уверен в одном: рано или поздно Михаил Саакашвили не будет Президентом Грузии, потому что таковы законы политической жизни. И в этом случае у нового президента, кто бы им ни был, появится возможность наладить нормальные продуктивные отношения с Россией. Более того, я сразу хочу сказать, для меня самого очень больно, что между нашими странами нет нормальных отношений, потому что мы очень близкие страны, очень близкие народы. Если бы не эта идиотская авантюра, то даже такой очень сложный политический процесс, который происходил тогда, можно было тянуть ещё годами и в конце концов вырулить на приемлемое, наверное, для всех решение, для грузин, для жителей Абхазии и для жителей Южной Осетии. Именно этого я ему никогда не прощу. И я считаю, что свою оценку ему должен дать грузинский народ, но сделать это демократическим способом. Завершая разговор о нём, могу сказать одну вещь. Он вообще должен быть признателен мне, что в какой‑то момент я просто остановил войска. Если бы они вошли в Тбилиси, то скорее всего в настоящий момент в Грузии был бы другой президент. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Only because Saakashvili committed a crime in relation to the Russian Federation and to its citizens. On his orders hundreds of our citizens were killed, including our peacekeepers. I will never forgive him this, and therefore I will not communicate with him, although he periodically tries to wink in various international corridors and so on. With everyone else — please, I see no problems; we can communicate on any topics, within, of course, the international-legal status that has taken shape in the region, and within the framework of those decisions, very hard and not simple for me, that I took. But for me he is a person one does not shake hands with. I understand that he is the lawfully elected President of Georgia. Only the Georgian people can give him marks and render verdicts on him. In any case I am sure of one thing: sooner or later Mikhail Saakashvili will not be President of Georgia, because such are the laws of political life. And in that case the new president, whoever he may be, will have the possibility of establishing normal productive relations with Russia. Moreover, I want to say at once that it is very painful for me myself that there are no normal relations between our countries, because we are very close countries, very close peoples. If not for this idiotic adventure, then even that very complicated political process which was going on then could have been drawn out for years more and in the end steered toward a solution probably acceptable to everyone, to the Georgians, to the residents of Abkhazia, and to the residents of South Ossetia. It is precisely this that I will never forgive him. And I consider that the Georgian people must give him their assessment, but do it in a democratic way. Concluding the talk about him, I can say one thing. He ought in general to be grateful to me that at a certain moment I simply stopped the troops. If they had entered Tbilisi, then most likely at the present moment there would be a different president in Georgia. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Господин Президент, у нас как раз куча вопросов по этому поводу. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Mr. President, we actually have a lot of questions about this. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: One more question. In Europe, they still believe that while Russia’s initial response was legitimate as self-defence, further actions of the Russian troops were excessive. After all, why wasn’t it an option to simply push the Georgian forces out of South Ossetia and stop at that point? |
| Д.Медведев: Куча? Кучи не надо, я уже сказал почти всё. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: A heap? No need for a heap; I have already said almost everything. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Например, почему Вы остановили? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: For example, why did you stop? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, you were referring to the peace enforcement operation, and I keep thinking back to today: Libya and Syria. When do you consider it acceptable to step in? What is your rationale for deciding whether it’s okay to launch a peace-enforcement mission? Here is Russia being lenient to Gaddafi in Libya, and here it is imposing sanctions against Syria. How do you accommodate your decisions on Georgia back then, and Russia’s stance on today’s crises? |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Почему Вы не дошли до Тбилиси? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Why did you not reach Tbilisi? |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, я считаю, что цель той операции по принуждению к миру, которая продолжалась пять дней, была выполнена. Целью этой операции не был захват Тбилиси или какого‑то города. Нужно было просто остановить агрессию, которую развязал Саакашвили. Более того, я не судья и не палач, ещё раз подчёркиваю, оценку Саакашвили и его судьбу должен определить народ при помощи голосования или другим способом, как иногда это происходит в истории. Но в мои планы и тогда не входило – и я сейчас об этом могу откровенно сказать, я считаю, я правильно поступил, – низвержение Саакашвили силовым способом, хотя это сделать было очень просто. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I consider that the aim of that operation to compel peace, which lasted five days, was achieved. The aim of that operation was not the capture of Tbilisi or of any city. One simply had to stop the aggression that Saakashvili had unleashed. Moreover, I am not a judge and not an executioner; I stress once more that the people must determine the judgment on Saakashvili and his fate, by means of a vote or in another way, as sometimes happens in history. But the overthrow of Saakashvili by force was not part of my plans then either — and I can say this frankly now; I consider that I acted rightly — although doing so would have been very simple. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Ещё один вопрос. В Европе всё‑таки считают, что первоначальный ответ России, конечно, был оправдан целями защиты, а последующие действия российских войск были чрезмерными. Действительно, почему всё‑таки нельзя было выдавить грузинские войска из Южной Осетии и ограничиться этим? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: One more question. In Europe, they still believe that Russia's initial response was, of course, justified by the goals of defense, while subsequent actions by Russian troops were excessive. Indeed, why could not the Georgian troops be squeezed out of South Ossetia and limited to that? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: What about Syria? |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, все эти рассуждения, конечно, вполне возможны, я их неоднократно слышал, но попробуйте поставить себя на место Верховного Главнокомандующего российскими Вооружёнными Силами, а именно на моё место. Можно, конечно, было выдавить и остановиться, но что мы слышали: мы сейчас отойдём на какие‑то прежние порядки, американские друзья и некоторые другие нам помогут довооружиться, восстановить самолёты, ещё что‑то, и мы с удвоенной энергией продолжим ту операцию, которая была. Но это было бы просто преступлением по отношению к памяти тех, кто погиб, защищая свою землю. Именно поэтому задача была в том, чтобы в тот момент демонтировать, разрушить военную машину Грузии, для того, чтобы она не могла наносить удары по мирным жителям, по жителям Абхазии, Осетии и Российской Федерации, потому что, Вы знаете, там всё намешано. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, all these reasonings are of course quite possible; I have heard them more than once, but try putting yourself in the place of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Armed Forces, namely in my place. One could of course have pushed them out and stopped, but what we heard was: we will now withdraw to some previous lines, American friends and some others will help us rearm, restore the aircraft, and something else besides, and with redoubled energy we will continue the operation that was under way. But that would simply have been a crime against the memory of those who died defending their land. That is precisely why the task at that moment was to dismantle, to destroy Georgia's military machine, so that it could not strike at civilians, at the inhabitants of Abkhazia, of Ossetia, and of the Russian Federation, because, you know, everything there is mixed together. |
| А.Венедиктов: Господин Президент, Вы сейчас говорили об операции по принуждению к миру, а передо мной всплывает, извините, сегодняшний день – это Ливия и это Сирия. Когда возможно, как Вы для себя определяете: здесь можно принуждение к миру, здесь Каддафи Россия пропустила, а на Сирию возложила эмбарго? Когда Вы принимали решение по Грузии и теперь, как Вы разложите это? Я думал, что [военные действия] это параноидальный сценарий, который никогда не будет реализован. То, что произошло 8-го, было для меня удивительным: тем самым Саакашвили лично растерзал своё Отечество. Он взял и порвал свою страну. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Mr. President, you are now speaking about the operation to force peace, but what comes to my mind is today – this is Libya and this is Syria. When is it possible, as you define for yourself: here one can force peace, here Russia let Kaddafi pass, while imposing an embargo on Syria? When did you make the decision regarding Georgia and now, how do you explain this? I thought that [military action] was a paranoid scenario that would never be realized. What happened on 8th was surprising to me: thus Saakashvili personally tore his homeland apart. He took and tore his country. |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, это всегда очень индивидуальная вещь, потому что не бывает одинаковых стран, не бывает одинаковых ситуаций. Что происходит в Ливии, я думаю, и Вам понятно. В Ливии есть человек, который 40 лет правит страной и который в какой‑то момент решил применить силу против собственного народа, что было осуждено всем человечеством и Российской Федерацией. Мы не принимаем участия в этой военной операции, тем не менее ряд стран пытается наводить там порядок военными возможностями. Мы не считаем это правильным. Но там есть один нюанс, о котором необходимо помнить. В отличие от Грузии, которая, что там скрывать, к тому моменту распалась на три части (и задача была в том, чтобы склеивать, не просто восстанавливать конституционный порядок, а в том, чтобы склеивать страну, если это было возможно), Ливия пока ни на что не распалась. Там есть такая угроза, но пока все (и повстанцы так называемые, и каддафисты – сторонники действующего лидера ливийской революции) выступают за единство собственной родины. Это несколько разные вещи. Но я об этом говорю не в смысле того, чтобы объяснить, почему так, почему сяк, а просто для того, чтобы проиллюстрировать: все ситуации, все модели абсолютно разные. То же самое касается и других стран. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, this is always a very individual thing, because there are no identical countries and there are no identical situations. What is happening in Libya is, I think, clear to you too. In Libya there is a man who has ruled the country for 40 years and who at a certain moment decided to use force against his own people, which was condemned by all humanity and by the Russian Federation. We are not taking part in this military operation; nevertheless a number of countries are trying to impose order there by military means. We do not consider this right. But there is one nuance there that must be remembered. Unlike Georgia, which, why hide it, had by that moment fallen into three parts — and the task was to glue it together, not simply to restore constitutional order, but to glue the country together, if that was possible — Libya has not yet fallen apart into anything. There is such a threat there, but so far everyone, both the so-called rebels and the Gaddafists, the supporters of the acting leader of the Libyan revolution, speaks for the unity of their own homeland. These are somewhat different things. But I say this not in the sense of explaining why it is this way or that way, but simply in order to illustrate: all situations, all models, are absolutely different. The same applies to other countries too. |
| А.Венедиктов: А Сирия? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: And Syria? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Let us look at some of the numbers. In the wake of the war in 2008, Russian envoys and the representatives of South Ossetia’s de facto government argued that the fighting in Tskhinval had claimed 2,000 lives. That was the number that was announced. Later on, Russia’s Investigative Committee estimated the casualties at no more than 150 people. Meanwhile, it was this alleged toll of 2,000 that had served as one of the main reasons for launching the so-called peace enforcement operation. How would you account for this discrepancy now, three years after the war? ”Saakashvili is the legally elected president of Georgia, and it is only up to the Georgian people to grant or deny him a vote of confidence. Sooner or later, he will no longer be president of Georgia. The next president of Georgia will have a chance to restore positive and beneficial relations with Russia.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Сирия – более сложная тема. В Сирии ситуация, к сожалению, пока идёт очень драматическим путём. Мы все, реальные политики, должны следить за тем, как развиваются события. Каддафи в какой‑то момент отдал максимально жёсткие указания по уничтожению оппозиционеров. Нынешний Президент Сирии таких указаний не отдавал. К сожалению, там гибнут люди в большом количестве. Это вызывает наше огромное беспокойство. Поэтому и в личном общении с ним, и в тех письмах, которые я ему направлял, я провожу одну идею: нужно срочно проводить реформы, мириться с оппозицией, восстанавливать гражданский мир и создавать современное государство. Если он не сможет это сделать, его ждёт печальная участь, и в конечном счёте нам тоже придётся принимать какие‑то решения. Мы тоже, естественно, наблюдаем за развитием этой ситуации, она меняется, как меняются и какие‑то наши ориентиры. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Syria is a more complicated subject. In Syria the situation is unfortunately still proceeding along a very dramatic path. All of us who are practical politicians must follow how events develop. At a certain moment Gaddafi gave the harshest instructions for the destruction of the opposition. The current President of Syria gave no such instructions. Unfortunately people are dying there in large numbers. This causes us enormous anxiety. So both in personal contact with him and in the letters I sent him, I pursue one idea: reforms must be carried out urgently, one must make peace with the opposition, civil peace must be restored, and a modern state created. If he cannot do this, a sad fate awaits him, and in the end we too will have to take some decisions. We too are of course watching how this situation develops; it is changing, just as some of our bearings are changing. |
| А.Венедиктов: Тогда позвольте более жёстко. Чем отличается то, что Саакашвили делал в Цхинвале, от того, что в 99-м году Россия делала в Грозном? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Then allow me to be stricter. What is the difference between what Saakashvili did in Tskhinvali and what Russia did in Grozny in 99? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: But a lot of Tskhinval’s citizens were evacuated then, because they knew… |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Sophie Shevardnadze: Two weeks before the conflict started. |
| 7 Distinguishing Georgia from Libya, Syria, and Chechnya | |
| Д.Медведев: Да, это вопрос, который довольно часто я слышу. Дело в том, что в Грозном Россия не занималась тем, чем занимались в Цхинвале. Мы занимались обычными вещами, мы просто наводили порядок. Мы просто наводили порядок, мы не занимались уничтожением собственного народа, который формально входил тогда в территорию Грузии. Мы боролись с бандитами, с теми людьми, которые под различными лозунгами (иногда псевдоисламскими, а иногда просто абсолютно экстремистскими) боролись с конституционной властью. Ничего подобного ни в Цхинвале, ни в Абхазии мы, естественно, не видели, потому что там уже давно существовали анклавы, в которых были собственные правительства, которые сами себя провозгласили государствами и в которых более или менее обеспечивался правопорядок. Это принципиально разные ситуации. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Yes, this is a question I hear fairly often. The point is that in Grozny Russia was not doing what was being done in Tskhinvali. We were occupied with ordinary things; we were simply restoring order. We were simply restoring order; we were not occupied with destroying our own people, who at that time formally belonged to the territory of Georgia. We were fighting bandits, those people who under various slogans — sometimes pseudo-Islamic, and sometimes simply wholly extremist — were fighting the constitutional authorities. Naturally we saw nothing of the kind either in Tskhinvali or in Abkhazia, because enclaves had long existed there in which there were governments of their own, which had proclaimed themselves states, and in which law and order was more or less maintained. These are fundamentally different situations. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Дмитрий Анатольевич, давайте тогда по цифрам. Тоже война 2008 года. Тогда представители, официальные представители Российской Федерации, а также представители де-факто властей Южной Осетии заявляли о том, что в Цхинвале погибли 2 тысячи человек. Была озвучена такая цифра. Позже Следственный комитет Генпрокуратуры Российской Федерации заявил о том, что погибших до 150. А ведь именно эта цифра, 2 тысячи, была одним из основных аргументов при начале так называемой операции по принуждению к миру. То есть в этом случае как бы Вы сейчас оценили по прошествии трёх лет разницу в цифрах? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Dmitry Anatolyevich, let's talk in figures. It was also a war in 2008. At that time, official representatives of the Russian Federation, as well as representatives of the de facto authorities of South Ossetia, stated that 2 thousand people died in Tskhinvali. Such a figure was announced. Later, the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation stated that the number of deceased was up to 150. And indeed, this figure, 2 thousand, was one of the main arguments for starting the so-called operation to force peace. So, in this case, how would you now assess the difference in figures after three years? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, you said you gave the order to return fire. But the operation continued after that. Heavy weapons rolled in and the conflict turned into an all-out war. Could you tell us about how you made the decision to continue the operation? And another question that all our colleagues would like answered: who called whom first? Did you call Prime Minister Putin in Beijing first or did he call you? How did you and the prime minister co-ordinate the move? |
| 4 The Decision to Open Fire — The Hardest Night | |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, я неоднократно рассказывал, как я принимал это решение. Я никакими цифрами не руководствовался. Какая тут может быть арифметика? Я напомню, что происходило. В ночь с 7-го на 8-е число мне позвонил Министр обороны (я как раз двигался по Волге, был в отпуске, и вообще вся планета была в предвкушении Олимпиады, которая была в Китае) и сказал, что наш грузинский сосед начал активные боевые действия. Я, честно скажу, абсолютно, предельно откровенно, вначале очень засомневался и говорю: «Знаешь, надо проверить, он что, совсем сумасшедший, сбрендил, что ли? Может быть, это просто провокация какая‑то, он испытывает на прочность осетин и пытается что‑то нам показать?» Саакашвили – законно избранный Президент Грузии. Только грузинский народ может ставить ему оценки, выносить ему вердикты. Рано или поздно он не будет Президентом Грузии. У нового президента появится возможность наладить нормальные отношения с Россией. Проходит час, он говорит: «Нет, они уже ударили из всех орудий, они используют «Град». Я говорю: «Хорошо, жду новую информацию». Ещё какое‑то время проходит, он говорит: «Знаете, я хочу Вам доложить, они только что уничтожили палатку с нашими миротворцами, всех насмерть положили. Что я должен сделать?» Я сказал: «Открывайте ответный огонь на поражение». Никаких цифр в этот момент не фигурировало. К сожалению, это всегда на уровне вот таких прямых докладов и прямых, очень сложных решений. Я могу вам сказать, это была самая сложная ночь в моей жизни. Цифры о количестве погибших появились потом. Они действительно разнились и до сих пор разнятся. Я не следователь, я не эксперт, я не занимаюсь эксгумацией трупов. Наши осетинские друзья, коллеги говорят, что значительное количество трупов было захоронено и до сих пор не найдено. Грузинские аналитики оперируют другими цифрами. Знаете, мы вообще не должны вот так рассуждать: 2 тысячи достаточно, а 150 – об этом можно забыть, это разве жизни, подумаешь, 150 человек. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I have repeatedly told how I took this decision. I was not guided by any figures. What arithmetic can there be here? I will remind you of what was happening. On the night of the 7th to the 8th the Minister of Defense called me (I was just then moving along the Volga, I was on leave, and in general the whole planet was in anticipation of the Olympics, which were in China) and said that our Georgian neighbor had begun active combat operations. I will say honestly, absolutely, with the utmost frankness: at first I doubted very much, and I say: "You know, one must check; has he gone completely mad, lost his mind, or what? Perhaps this is simply some provocation; he is testing the Ossetians' firmness and trying to show us something?" Saakashvili is the lawfully elected President of Georgia. Only the Georgian people can give him marks and render verdicts on him. Sooner or later he will not be President of Georgia. The new president will have the possibility of establishing normal relations with Russia. An hour passes, and he says: "No, they have already struck from all their guns; they are using the Grad." I say: "Good, I am waiting for new information." Some more time passes, and he says: "You know, I want to report to you: they have just destroyed the tent with our peacekeepers; they have laid them all dead. What am I to do?" I said: "Open return fire to kill." No figures figured at that moment. Unfortunately, this is always at the level of such direct reports and direct, very hard decisions. I can tell you, this was the hardest night of my life. Figures on the number of dead appeared afterward. They really did differ, and they differ to this day. I am not an investigator, I am not an expert, I do not occupy myself with the exhumation of corpses. Our Ossetian friends and colleagues say that a significant number of corpses were buried and have still not been found. Georgian analysts operate with other figures. You know, we ought not to reason like this at all: 2 thousand is enough, while 150 — one can forget about that; are these lives, just think, 150 people. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Но речь идёт о том, что были эвакуированы многие жители Цхинвала тогда, потому что знали в Южной Осетии… |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: But the point is that many residents of Tskhinvali were evacuated at that time because they knew in South Ossetia... |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Twenty four hours?! |
| С.Шеварднадзе: За две недели до начала конфликта. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Two weeks before the start of the conflict. |
| Д.Медведев: Я думаю, что кто‑то мог и уехать, безусловно, но я просто отвечаю на Ваш вопрос, говорю, что количество погибших никогда для любого нормального человека не должно быть критерием того, что он собирается предпринять в ответ. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I think that someone could have left, of course, but I am simply answering your question: I am saying that the number of those killed must never, for any normal person, be the criterion of what he intends to undertake in response. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, Вы сказали о том, что дали команду открыть ответный огонь, но дальше началась операция, дальше пошло тяжёлое вооружение, началась война. Скажите, пожалуйста, как Вы принимали решение о продолжении операции? И такой вопрос, который задают, извините, все наши коллеги: кто кому позвонил, Вы Владимиру Владимировичу в Пекин или он Вам из Пекина? Как Вы с Премьер-министром согласовывали? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, you said that you gave the order to open return fire, but then the operation began, then heavy weapons were used, and the war began. Please tell me, how did you make the decision to continue the operation? And such a question, I apologize, that all our colleagues ask: who called whom, did you call Vladimir Vladimirovich in Beijing or did he call you from Beijing? How did you coordinate with the Prime Minister? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: In relation to this, we have to mention Mr Sarkozy who was at the time chairman of the EU. |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, по‑честному сказать, никто никому не звонил. Мы с ним связались спустя сутки. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, to be honest, no one called anyone. We got in touch with him a day later. |
| А.Венедиктов: Спустя сутки? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: After a day? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Why is that? |
| Д.Медведев: Спустя сутки. Я уже все приказы отдал. Там уже вовсю всё полыхало. Владимир Владимирович просто выступил с заявлением о том, что мы категорически этого не приемлем, естественно, правильно поступил. Спустя сутки мы только с ним связалась, поговорили по закрытой связи, потому что такие вопросы, как Вы понимаете, всё‑таки по радиотелефону не очень хорошо обсуждать, а с другими странами эта связь организуется не очень просто. Спустя сутки мы поговорили, потом он вернулся, мы уже, естественно, какие‑то вещи обсуждали, но ещё до его возвращения я собрал Совбез, объяснил свою позицию, почему я принял решение открыть ответный огонь и вступить в этот конфликт, члены Совета Безопасности меня поддержали. После этого я собрал всех в Сочи, там уже был и Путин тоже. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: A day later. I had already given all the orders. Everything there was already blazing away. Vladimir Vladimirovich simply made a statement that we categorically do not accept this; naturally, he acted rightly. Only a day later did we get in touch with him and talk on a closed line, because such questions, as you understand, are all the same not very good to discuss by radiotelephone, and with other countries this link is not organized very simply. A day later we talked, then he returned; we of course already discussed certain things, but even before his return I convened the Security Council, explained my position, why I had taken the decision to open return fire and enter this conflict, and the members of the Security Council supported me. After that I gathered everyone in Sochi; Putin was already there too. |
| А.Венедиктов: В этой связи появляется сразу фигура господина Саркози, который тогда возглавлял Европейский союз. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: In this connection, the figure of Mr. Sarkozy immediately appears, who at that time headed the European Union. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: I see. According to some, it was Sarkozy who persuaded you to halt the Russian forces’ march towards Tbilisi. ”I believe that the peace enforcement operation was a mission accomplished. Our mission was not to capture Tbilisi or any other city in Georgia. Our only objective was to halt the invasion that Saakashvili had unleashed. Deposing Saakashvili by force wasn’t on my agenda back then, even though it would’ve been a piece of cake. If the troops had marched into Tbilisi, Georgia would most likely have a different president by now.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Не могу о нём говорить без улыбки в отличие от другого коллеги, о котором мне до этого приходилось рассуждать. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I cannot speak about him without a smile, unlike another colleague about whom I previously had to reason. |
| А.Венедиктов: Почему? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Why? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Mr President, according to some analysts, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was not entirely in line with the spirit of the Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire. The plan was that Russian troops would return to where they were before the conflict. Russia for its part recognised the two breakaway republics and stationed its forces at military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. How did Mr Sarkozy react to that? |
| Д.Медведев: Потому что он у меня вызывает симпатию. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Because he arouses sympathy in me. |
| А.Венедиктов: Понятно. Есть версия о том, что именно Саркози уговорил Вас остановить продвижение российских войск в сторону Тбилиси. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Understandable. There is a version that it was Sarkozy who persuaded you to stop the advance of Russian troops towards Tbilisi. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Not the decision to recognise them, I was referring to the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. |
| Д.Медведев: Нет, конечно. Ни один иностранный руководитель не способен уговорить другого. Весь мир пытается уговаривать Каддафи. И что, уговорили? И не уговорят. Он скорее умрёт в этой своей землянке. Нет. Я ещё раз подчёркиваю, у нас никогда не было цели брать какие‑то города или ещё что‑то. Речь шла только о том, чтобы остановить военную машину, которая в тот момент была направлена против двух отколовшихся территорий и против наших граждан, к сожалению. Цель операции по принуждению к миру была выполнена. Целью этой операции не был захват Тбилиси или какого‑то города. Нужно было просто остановить агрессию, которую развязал Саакашвили. В мои планы не входило низвержение Саакашвили силовым способом, хотя это сделать было очень просто. Если бы войска вошли в Тбилиси – в настоящий момент в Грузии был бы другой президент. Саркози сделал очень добрую вещь, он позвонил мне и говорит: «Слушай, там у вас конфликт. Давай я прилечу». Я говорю: «Я буду рад тебя видеть». – «Я сейчас председательствую в Евросоюзе, я мог бы приехать, может быть, мы о чём‑то порассуждали бы». Ему нравится это, он в этом смысле человек умелый. Он приехал, мы с ним поговорили. Я ему объяснил свой резон. Он сказал: «Да, я с тобой согласен. Здесь действительно это так и так. Я какие‑то вещи могу сказать вслух, какие‑то не могу. Тем не менее я хотел бы внести свою лепту в то, чтобы остановить этот конфликт». Я говорю: «Хорошо. Давай согласуем определённый план (который впоследствии назвали «план Медведева – Саркози»), и с этим планом ты поедешь в Грузию и предъявишь его». И может быть, самое ценное, что он сделал, он не побоялся приехать в Россию в тот период, когда действительно только ленивый не рассуждал о том, что мы сделали, он не побоялся поехать в Грузию с нашими предложениями и в целом получил достаточно удовлетворительную реакцию со стороны грузинских властей, прежде всего самого Саакашвили. В этом его вклад в наведение мостов и решение этой задачи. Я ему до сих пор за это признателен. Он действительно сыграл очень важную роль. Но, конечно, он не говорил: «Знаешь, нужно здесь остановиться». Он понимал, что, как я считаю целесообразным сделать, я так и буду поступать. Конечно, его задача была остановить всё это как можно быстрее. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: No, of course not. Not a single foreign leader is capable of persuading another. The whole world is trying to persuade Gaddafi. And what, did they persuade him? And they will not persuade him. He would sooner die in that dugout of his. No. I emphasize once more: we never had the aim of taking any cities or anything else. It was only a matter of stopping the military machine that at that moment was directed against two territories that had broken away, and against our citizens, unfortunately. The aim of the operation to compel peace was fulfilled. The aim of this operation was not the capture of Tbilisi or of any city. The aggression that Saakashvili unleashed simply had to be stopped. It was not in my plans to overthrow Saakashvili by force, although this would have been very simple to do. If the troops had entered Tbilisi, at the present moment there would be a different president in Georgia. Sarkozy did a very kind thing; he called me and says: "Listen, you have a conflict there. Let me fly over." I say: "I will be glad to see you." — "I am now presiding in the European Union; I could come; perhaps we could reason about something." He likes this; in this sense he is a skillful person. He came; we talked with him. I explained my reason to him. He said: "Yes, I agree with you. Here it really is so and so. Some things I can say aloud; some I cannot. Nevertheless I would like to make my contribution to stopping this conflict." I say: "Good. Let us agree a definite plan (which was afterward called the Medvedev–Sarkozy plan), and with this plan you will go to Georgia and present it." And perhaps the most valuable thing he did was that he was not afraid to come to Russia in that period, when really only the lazy were not reasoning about what we had done; he was not afraid to go to Georgia with our proposals and on the whole received a fairly satisfactory reaction from the Georgian authorities, above all from Saakashvili himself. This is his contribution to building bridges and to solving this task. I am still grateful to him for this. He really did play a very important role. But of course he did not say: "You know, one needs to stop here." He understood that, as I consider it expedient to do, so I will act. Of course his task was to stop all this as quickly as possible. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Господин Президент, по мнению западных аналитиков, признание Абхазии, Южной Осетии не совсем соответствовало духу соглашения о перемирии «Медведев – Саркози». Там говорилось, что после окончания войны российские войска возвращаются до довоенных позиций. А Россия же, признав эти два государства, оставила свои войска там. Теперь в Абхазии и Южной Осетии есть российские военные базы. Вот интересно, как отреагировал на это Ваше решение Саркози, собственно, соавтор? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Mr. President, according to Western analysts, the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia did not quite correspond to the spirit of the 'Medvedev-Sarkozy' ceasefire agreement. It stated that after the end of the war, Russian troops would return to pre-war positions. And Russia, having recognized these two states, left its troops there. Now there are Russian military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Now I wonder how Mr. Sarkozy, the actual co-author, reacted to your decision. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: But French officials — Prime Minister Fillon and recently President Sarkozy — have said they were still waiting for President Medvedev to complete the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Meaning — for Russian forces to return to their positions. |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, я не хочу на него вешать бремя ответственности за тот указ, который я подписал. Конечно, он никакой не соавтор решения о признании. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I do not want to place on him the burden of responsibility for the decree that I signed. Of course, he is in no way a coauthor of the decision on recognition. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Нет, не признания. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: No, not recognition. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: To their pre-conflict positions. |
| Д.Медведев: Более того, я могу Вам сказать, что я, конечно, с ним это не обсуждал, потому что это не предмет его визита, собственно, он этим и не занимался. Конечно, не буду скрывать, и он, и некоторые другие мои партнёры по Евросоюзу говорили: напрасно Вы это делаете, Вы создаёте для себя проблемы – и так далее. Естественно, я всё это слышал. Но решение, которое я принимал, объяснялось другим, конечно, не реакцией моих партнёров. Что касается плана Медведева – Саркози. Он вообще не по этому поводу. План Медведева – Саркози о том, как остановить войну, о том, как остановить ту проблему, которую создала авантюра Саакашвили. И в этом смысле я считаю, что этот план сработал. Российская позиция проста: план Медведева – Саркози: а) удался; б) выполнен на сто процентов. Все другие интерпретации я не слышу, потому что считаю их неверными. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Moreover, I can tell you that I of course did not discuss this with him, because it was not the subject of his visit; in fact he was not occupied with this. Of course I will not conceal that both he and some other partners of mine in the European Union said: you are doing this in vain, you are creating problems for yourself — and so on. Naturally I heard all of this. But the decision I took was explained by something else, of course, not by the reaction of my partners. As for the Medvedev–Sarkozy plan. It is not about this at all. The Medvedev–Sarkozy plan is about how to stop the war, about how to stop the problem created by Saakashvili's reckless venture. And in that sense I consider that this plan worked. The Russian position is simple: the Medvedev–Sarkozy plan: a) succeeded; b) was carried out one hundred percent. I do not hear any of the other interpretations, because I consider them incorrect. |
| А.Венедиктов: Заметьте, французская сторона, недавно и Премьер-министр Фийон, и Президент Саркози, говорит о том, что они все ждут от Дмитрия Медведева, что он закончит выполнение плана Медведева – Саркози. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Note that the French side, recently both Prime Minister Fillion and President Sarkozy, says that they are all waiting from Dmitry Medvedev that he will finish implementing the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Regarding the EU and the international perception of the conflict, the US and the EU have been criticising Russia for failing to complete the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. In addition, The US Senate recently stated that, like the European Parliament, they believe that Russia’s actions in Georgia have led to the occupation of 20% of Georgia’s territory. As a liberal leader, how do you feel about them phrasing it that way? ”The Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was aimed at stopping the war that Saakashvili’s undertaking had caused. In that sense it was a complete success. Russia’s position on that is quite simple: the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was carried out and it was successful. The plan said nothing about Russia not recognising Abkhazia or South Ossetia.“ |
| Е.Котрикадзе: То есть он выведет войска на довоенные позиции. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: That is, he will withdraw troops to pre-war positions. |
| 8 The Medvedev–Sarkozy Plan Fully Fulfilled | |
| Д.Медведев: Уважаемые друзья, могу вам сказать одну вещь. Есть позиция Франции, есть позиция Евросоюза, она по этому поводу отлична от нашей. С этим ничего не сделать, мы действительно здесь не сходимся. Я считаю, что я выполнил план Медведева – Саркози на все сто процентов. В этом плане нигде не говорилось о том, что мы не будем признавать Абхазию и Осетию или о каких‑то других вещах. Что касается отвода войск, то он произошёл. Он произошёл. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Dear friends, I can tell you one thing. There is France's position, and there is the European Union's position; on this matter it differs from ours. Nothing can be done about this; we really do not converge here. I consider that I carried out the Medvedev–Sarkozy plan one hundred percent. Nowhere in this plan was it said that we would not recognize Abkhazia and Ossetia, or anything about any other matters. As for the withdrawal of the troops, it took place. It took place. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: На довоенные позиции. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: To pre-war positions. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, we have talked about the reactions of the US Senate and the European Parliament. Let me now ask you about how our partners in the Collective Security Treaty Organisation and the CIS reacted. Not a single member of the CSTO, CIS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation supported Russia’s actions. These are countries that call themselves Russia’s allies and partners. They didn’t support Russia’s actions and they did not recognise the breakaway republics. How do you feel today when you discuss the matter with officials from these states? |
| Д.Медведев: Да, и в этом смысле на довоенные позиции в понимании российской стороны. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Yes, and in that sense to the pre-war positions as understood by the Russian side. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: В продолжение темы Евросоюза и позиции Запада относительно этого конфликта. Помимо того что США и Европейский союз критикуют Россию за невыполнение плана Медведева – Саркози, кроме этого Сенат Соединённых Штатов совсем недавно, на днях, сделал официальное заявление, равно как и Европейский парламент, они считают действия России на территории Грузии, в Абхазии и Южной Осетии, оккупацией 20 процентов территории Грузии. Вы, Дмитрий Анатольевич, – либеральный лидер. Всё‑таки как Вы оцениваете такую формулировку – «оккупация»? План Медведева – Саркози о том, как остановить войну, решить проблему, которую создала авантюра Саакашвили. Считаю, что этот план сработал. Российская позиция проста: план удался и выполнен на сто процентов. В этом плане не говорилось, что мы не будем признавать Абхазию или Южную Осетию. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Continuing the topic of the European Union and the West's position on this conflict. Besides the fact that the United States and the European Union criticize Russia for failing to implement the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, the US Senate very recently, just a few days ago, made an official statement, as did the European Parliament; they consider Russia's actions on the territory of Georgia, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, to be the occupation of 20 percent of Georgia's territory. You, Dmitry Anatolyevich, are a liberal leader. How do you evaluate such a formulation – 'occupation'? The Medvedev-Sarkozy plan on how to stop the war and solve the problem created by Saakashvili's adventure. I believe that this plan worked. The Russian position is simple: the plan succeeded and was implemented to one hundred percent. This plan did not state that we would not recognize Abkhazia or South Ossetia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: You could regard it as an example to Nagorno Karabakh [[in the southern Caucasus]]… |
| 9 Dismissing Western "Occupation" Charges | |
| Д.Медведев: Я думаю, что Вам мой ответ приблизительно понятен, мой ответ как либерального лидера современной и развивающейся России. Я думаю, что эти формулировки Сената ни на чём не основаны, они отражают вкусовые пристрастия отдельных престарелых членов Сената, которые в силу субъективных причин симпатизируют тем или иным людям. Это их дело, это иностранный парламент, мне до него нет абсолютно никакого дела, скажем так, мне безразличны их формулировки. Я же считаю совершенно иначе, и моя позиция выражена в тех указах, которые я подписал в этот очень трудный период. Надо сказать предельно откровенно, хотя, наверное, здесь у нас с вами разные позиции: мне не стыдно за эти указы. Не только не стыдно, я считаю, что это были абсолютно правильные и необходимые в этот момент решения, потому что иначе эту трагедию невозможно было остановить никак. Это были очень сложные решения, и я понимал, на что я иду. Я могу вам прямо сказать, даже когда я обсуждал это с разными людьми, со своим ближайшим окружением, говорил: давайте подумаем. То есть не было такой ситуации, когда все говорят: давай, это абсолютно правильная вещь. Это всё родилось в процессе обсуждения. Но я считаю, что решение, которое я тогда принял, было абсолютно чётким и выверенным, и в этом смысл того, что было сделано: признать международную правосубъектность новых территорий, для того чтобы их защитить. Что касается будущего, а это всегда тот вопрос, который следует за этим, то его не знает никто. Я буду очень рад, если, скажем, руководство Грузии, руководство Абхазии и Южной Осетии сядут за стол переговоров и будут думать о том, как они будут жить дальше, как в регионе будет обеспечиваться мир и правопорядок, какова судьба очень близких народов, что они могут потенциально когда‑нибудь создать. Это их дело. И если когда‑нибудь до этого дойдёт, я буду счастлив, Россия этому никогда препятствовать не будет. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I think my answer is approximately clear to you, my answer as the liberal leader of a modern and developing Russia. I think these formulations of the Senate are based on nothing; they reflect the tastes of individual elderly members of the Senate who, for subjective reasons, sympathize with this or that person. That is their affair; this is a foreign parliament; I have absolutely nothing to do with it, let us say; their formulations are a matter of indifference to me. I, however, consider things completely otherwise, and my position is expressed in the decrees I signed in this very difficult period. One must say it with the utmost frankness, although probably you and I have different positions here: I am not ashamed of these decrees. Not only am I not ashamed; I consider that these were absolutely correct and necessary decisions at that moment, because otherwise this tragedy could not have been stopped in any way. These were very complicated decisions, and I understood what I was going into. I can tell you straight that even when I discussed this with various people, with my closest circle, I said: let us think. That is, there was no such situation in which everyone says: go ahead, this is an absolutely correct thing. All of this was born in the process of discussion. But I consider that the decision I took then was absolutely clear and carefully weighed, and this is the meaning of what was done: to recognize the international legal personality of the new territories, in order to protect them. As for the future, and this is always the question that follows this one, no one knows it. I will be very glad if, say, the leadership of Georgia, the leadership of Abkhazia, and of South Ossetia sit down at the negotiating table and think about how they will live further, how peace and law and order will be ensured in the region, what the fate of very close peoples is, what they may potentially create someday. That is their affair. And if it ever comes to that, I will be happy; Russia will never hinder this. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, коллега спросила Вас про реакцию Сената США и Европейского парламента, а я Вас спрошу про реакцию наших партнёров по ОДКБ и по СНГ. Ни одна страна, входящая в ОДКБ, ни одно государство, входящее в СНГ, ни одно государство, входящее в ШОС, то есть наши союзники и партнёры, которые себя так сами называют, не поддержали это решение, не признали. Когда Вы с ними говорите на эту тему, что Вы… |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, a colleague asked you about the reaction of the US Senate and the European Parliament, and I will ask you about the reaction of our partners in the CSTO and the CIS. Not a single country belonging to the CSTO, not a single state belonging to the CIS, not a single state belonging to the SCO, that is, our allies and partners, who call themselves that, did not support this decision, did not recognize it. When you talk to them about this topic, what do you... |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: No, I just want to bring the discussion of this to a close with an example that is relevant today. You are personally involved in negotiations on Nagorno Karabakh. You have had nine rounds of consultations… |
| 10 Allies' Non-Recognition — No Pressure Applied | |
| Д.Медведев: Я могу Вам рассказать, я, по‑моему, даже об этом когда‑то говорил, но скажу ещё раз. Когда это всё произошло, я собрал ОДКБ, позвал своих товарищей и говорю: «Вы знаете, такое очень тяжёлое решение мне пришлось принять. Я вам прямо говорю, я от вас ничего не жду, потому что я понимаю, сколь сложными для вас будут подобные решения. У многих из вас есть территориальные проблемы, у всех у вас есть экономические проблемы, мы все живём в довольно сложном взаимно дополняемом мире. Поэтому я вас ни к чему не призываю. А наше решение окончательное и бесповоротное. Но это не значит, что я к вам обращаюсь с просьбой признать эти новые субъекты международного права. Признаете – ваше дело, не признаете – ничего в нашей позиции не изменится». И потом, вы знаете, всё‑таки я хоть молодой и либеральный Президент, но у меня некоторый опыт есть. Я прекрасно понимал, что после этого признания не так много будет государств, которые пожелают признавать вот эти сложившиеся реалии. Но это уже другая история. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I can tell you, I think I even said this once before, but I will say it again. When all this happened, I convened the CSTO, called my comrades, and said: 'You know, I had to make a very difficult decision. I tell you directly, I expect nothing from you, because I understand how difficult such decisions will be for you. Many of you have territorial problems, all of you have economic problems, we all live in a rather complex mutually complementary world. Therefore, I am not calling you to anything. And our decision is final and irrevocable. But this does not mean that I am appealing to you with a request to recognize these new subjects of international law. If you recognize it, that is your business; if you do not recognize it, nothing will change in our position.' And then, you know, I am after all a young and liberal President, but I have some experience. I perfectly understood that after this recognition, not many states would wish to recognize these established realities. But that is another story. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: And no result. |
| А.Венедиктов: Смотрите, Дмитрий Анатольевич, это же пример, скажем, для Нагорного Карабаха. Вы непосредственно лично вовлечены в переговоры по Нагорному Карабаху. Девять раундов консультаций. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Look, Dmitry Anatolyevich, this is an example, let's say, for Nagorno-Karabakh. You are personally directly involved in negotiations on Nagorno-Karabakh. Nine rounds of consultations. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Nothing. I think the last round did not get us anywhere either. How do you think Armenia and Azerbaijan feel when they look at the what happened to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. What are they supposed to do? Should they take the region back by force? |
| Е.Котрикадзе: И ничего. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: And nothing. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: That’s a great question, Alexei. You know, both President Aliyev and President Sargsyan came to Sochi shortly after the conflict in Georgia broke out. Do you know what they told me? They said it was a very bad thing, bad for the Caucasus. But then each of them added that it was also a lesson. They said they realised it was better to conduct seemingly endless negotiations on what will happen to Nagorno Karabakh, whether the region will ever have a referendum and what the peace treaty would look like than go through five days of war. I think this is a good example because if our friend in Georgia had been a little smarter we could have been meeting in Sochi, Kazan, or any other venue today to discuss possible middle-of-the-road solutions for the relations between Georgia and its breakaway provinces. It would have been a political process. I do not know what it would lead to. We may never have reached an agreement. A confederation, perhaps? What Saakashvili did was rip his own country into pieces. This is what people are going to remember. |
| А.Венедиктов: И ничего, да. Кажется, последняя консультация – тоже ничего. И я думаю, как смотрит на это руководство Армении и Азербайджана, на историю с Абхазией и Осетией? Я про это спрашиваю. Что должны сделать эти две стороны, вернуть районы? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: And nothing, yes. It seems the last consultation is also nothing. And I wonder how the leadership of Armenia and Azerbaijan views this, regarding the situation with Abkhazia and South Ossetia? That is what I am asking. What should these two sides do, return the districts? |
| 11 Refusing Dialogue with Saakashvili but Not Georgia | |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Coming back to Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. You said that you might have been able to reach an agreement if it had not been for Saakashvili. ”The decision I made [on recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia] was well thought-out. The essence of it was to recognise the territories as subjects to international law so we could protect them.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Очень хороший вопрос. Вы знаете, когда это произошло, оба руководителя (и Президент Алиев, и Президент Саргсян) побывали здесь же, в Сочи. Они знаете мне что сказали? Говорят: «Плохо, конечно, что всё это произошло, для Кавказа это тяжёлая вещь». Я говорю: «Очень плохо». – «Но Вы знаете, для нас это определённый урок, что лучше вести бесконечные переговоры о том, какова судьба Нагорного Карабаха, будет ли там референдум когда‑то, как нам готовить мирный договор, чем провести эти пять военных дней». Это был для них очень серьёзный урок. Мне кажется, это очень показательная вещь. Почему? Потому что, если возвращаться к тому, что произошло тогда, ведь если бы хоть немного ума достало нашему грузинскому коллеге, может быть, мы точно так же встречались бы в Сочи, в Казани, ещё где‑то и думали о том, каким образом нам искать компромиссы во взаимоотношениях между частями когда‑то одного государства, а сейчас Грузии и отколовшимися частями. Но это был бы политический процесс. Я не знаю, с какими перспективами. Может быть, никогда бы не договорились, может быть, что‑то пришло бы, может быть, возникла бы какая‑то конфедерация. А он взял и порвал свою страну. Вот я считаю, что именно это останется в памяти людей. И это самое главное. Если вернуться к признанию Абхазии и Осетии: Вы говорите, что не будет Саакашвили, наверное, возможно будет договориться. Решение [о признании независимости Абхазии и Южной Осетии], которое я тогда принял, было абсолютно чётким и выверенным. И в этом смысл того, что было сделано: признать международную правосубъектность новых территорий, для того чтобы их защитить. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: A very good question. You know, when this happened, both leaders (both President Aliyev and President Sargsyan) had been right here, in Sochi. Do you know what they said to me? They say: "It is bad, of course, that all this happened; for the Caucasus this is a hard thing." I say: "Very bad." — "But you know, for us this is a certain lesson: that it is better to conduct endless negotiations about what the fate of Nagorno-Karabakh is, whether there will be a referendum there someday, how we are to prepare a peace treaty, than to live through these five military days." This was a very serious lesson for them. It seems to me this is a very telling thing. Why? Because, if one returns to what happened then, after all, if our Georgian colleague had had even a little sense, perhaps we would in just the same way have been meeting in Sochi, in Kazan, somewhere else, and thinking about how we were to seek compromises in the relations between parts of what was once one state, and now Georgia and the parts that have broken away. But that would have been a political process. I do not know with what prospects. Perhaps we would never have agreed; perhaps something would have come of it; perhaps some confederation would have arisen. But he went and tore his country apart. That, I consider, is precisely what will remain in people's memory. And that is the most important thing. If one returns to the recognition of Abkhazia and Ossetia: you say that if there is no Saakashvili, it will probably be possible to agree. The decision [on recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia] that I took then was absolutely clear and carefully weighed. And this is the meaning of what was done: to recognize the international legal personality of the new territories, in order to protect them. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Sophie Shevardnadze: But the problem is, there is no political party in Georgia that would stand for the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Therefore, no matter who is elected after Saakashvili, they will disagree with Russia’s position. |
| Д.Медведев: Я не сказал «договориться». Я сказал, что тогда можно как минимум восстановить дипломатические отношения и начать переговорный процесс по любым вопросам, кроме тех, по которым у нас уже есть позиции. Но даже по этим вопросам мы можем разговаривать. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I did not say "come to an agreement." I said that then one could at least restore diplomatic relations and begin a negotiating process on any questions except those on which we already have positions. But even on those questions we can talk. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Вот в чём проблема, на сегодняшний день в Грузии не найдётся ни одной политической силы, которая готова смириться с потерей Абхазии и Южной Осетии. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Here is the problem: today, there is not a single political force in Georgia that is ready to accept the loss of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: What if Georgians continue to vote for the people currently in charge, for the way the country is going now. What would happen then? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Sophie Shevardnadze: Saakashvili stays in power until 2036. |
| Д.Медведев: Понимаю. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I understand. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Мы даже не говорим про Саакашвили. Но получается, что и с теми, кто придёт после него, у России фундаментальные разногласия. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: We are not even talking about Saakashvili. But it turns out that even with those who will come after him, there are fundamental disagreements with Russia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: The Russian Orthodox Church considers South Ossetia and Abkhazia parts of the Georgian patriarchate’s jurisdiction. Why is it that the positions of the spiritual and secular authorities on this matter are so different? |
| Д.Медведев: Да, разногласия будут, у меня сомнений нет. Но это будут люди, с которыми можно будет сесть за один стол, а это уже немаловажно. И я уверен, что они не откажутся сесть за один стол, даже несмотря на то что у нас есть фундаментальные разногласия. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Yes, there will be disagreements; I have no doubts. But these will be people with whom one can sit down at one table, and that is already of no small importance. And I am sure they will not refuse to sit at one table, even despite our having fundamental disagreements. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Господин Президент, а что если грузинский народ продолжит выбирать ту же команду и тот же курс? Вот что будет тогда? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Mr. President, what if the Georgian people continue to choose the same team and the same course? What will happen then? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, a question about South Ossetia. 95% of its residents are Russian citizens. In the 2008 presidential election, 90% of South Ossetians voted for President Medvedev. They receive benefits, pensions and everything else a Russian citizen is entitled to. They are Russian citizens. By looking at that, we can tell that Ossetians are still a divided people. They are divided into North Ossetia and South Ossetia. Stalin’s legacy. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Саакашвили останется до 36-го года. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Saakashvili will remain until the 36-th year. |
| Д.Медведев: Я могу сказать нелестные слова в адрес Саакашвили, потому что мне он в отличие от моего французского коллеги кажется человеком, который не достоин уважения. Но я не могу обижать народ. Если грузинский народ будет голосовать за ту или иную команду, это будет выбор грузинского народа. Мы будем с этим считаться. Наверное, это будет не в лучшую сторону отражаться на наших отношениях. Но мы будем считаться с тем, что грузинский народ голосует за конкретных людей. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I can say unflattering words about Saakashvili, because to me, unlike to my French colleague, he seems a man unworthy of respect. But I cannot insult a people. If the Georgian people vote for one team or another, that will be the Georgian people's choice. We will reckon with this. This will probably not be reflected in our relations for the better. But we will reckon with the fact that the Georgian people vote for particular people. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Дмитрий Анатольевич, Русская православная церковь считает Южную Осетию и Абхазию канонической территорией грузинского патриархата. Почему мнения властей светских и духовных так различаются по этому поводу? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Dmitry Anatolyevich, the Russian Orthodox Church considers South Ossetia and Abkhazia canonical territory of the Georgian patriarchate. Why do the opinions of secular and spiritual authorities differ so much on this matter? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Has the possibility of uniting these two republics been discussed by the Russian authorities? Perhaps South Ossetia could become part of Russia. How would you feel about that? ”There is no legal precondition [for South Ossetia to become part of Russia] as of now.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Потому что светские власти – это светские, а духовные – это духовные. Светские власти принимали решение под влиянием очень тяжёлых обстоятельств. Если бы их не было, не было бы и этих решений. Что касается духовных властей, у них отдельная ситуация, я бы не хотел в неё погружаться, это будет просто некорректно с моей стороны, хотя я (не буду скрывать) неоднократно обсуждал её и со Святейшим Патриархом Кириллом, и Святейшим Патриархом-Католикосом Илиёй Вторым. Мы тоже несколько раз встречались, это обсуждали. В этом нет ничего удивительного, потому что очень часто канонические территории церкви не совпадают с географическими границами государств. Слушайте, у нас абсолютно разные государства, теперь Россия и Украина, но Украинская православная церковь Московского патриархата действует там. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Because secular authorities are secular, and spiritual authorities are spiritual. The secular authorities took the decision under the influence of very grave circumstances. If those had not existed, these decisions would not have existed either. As for the spiritual authorities, they have a separate situation; I would not want to go into it, that would simply be incorrect on my part, although I will not conceal that I have repeatedly discussed it both with His Holiness Patriarch Kirill and with His Holiness Catholicos-Patriarch Ilia the Second. We too met several times and discussed this. There is nothing surprising in this, because very often the canonical territories of a church do not coincide with the geographical borders of states. Listen, we are now absolutely different states, Russia and Ukraine, but the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate operates there. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, вопрос про Южную Осетию. Смотрите, 95 процентов жителей Южной Осетии являются российскими гражданами, на выборах Президента, извините, в 2008 году 90 процентов жителей Южной Осетии проголосовали за Президента Медведева, они получают соответственные выплаты из Пенсионного фонда и так далее, они российские граждане. И в этой связи мы понимаем, что осетины в любом случае – разделённый народ, наследство Сталина, Северная Осетия и Южная Осетия. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, the question about South Ossetia. Look, 95 percent of the residents of South Ossetia are Russian citizens, in the presidential elections, excuse me, in 2008 year 90 percent of the residents of South Ossetia voted for President Medvedev, they receive corresponding payments from the Pension Fund and so on, they are Russian citizens. And in this connection we understand that Ossetians in any case – a divided people, Stalin's legacy, North Ossetia and South Ossetia. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: So the fact that all South Ossetians are Russian citizens and they are voting for President Medvedev is not a legal prerequisite for South Ossetia becoming a part of Russia? |
| Д.Медведев: Увы! |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Alas! |
| А.Венедиктов: Обсуждалась ли в руководстве России (мы сейчас об этом говорим) возможность объединения Северной и Южной Осетии, вступление Южной Осетии в Россию? Как Вы вообще относитесь к возможности такой процедуры? Никаких юридических предпосылок [для вступления Южной Осетии в состав России] в настоящий момент не существует. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Was the possibility of unifying North and South Ossetia, South Ossetia joining Russia, discussed in the leadership of Russia (we are talking about this now)? How do you generally feel about the possibility of such a procedure? There are currently no legal grounds [for South Ossetia joining the Russian Federation]. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Mr President, you predicted that the world would not recognise the breakaway states quickly. The process is going very slowly indeed. As of today, only three countries in the world have recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Obviously, this makes the life of the republics’ residents very inconvenient. For instance, a trip abroad could prove problematic for a resident. Are you ready to help them and start issuing Russian travel passports to citizens of Abkhazia and South Ossetia? |
| 12 South Ossetia's Future and No Annexation | |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, я думаю, что никаких юридических предпосылок в настоящий момент для этого не существует. Конечно, невозможно предвосхитить то, что будет в будущем, возможно различное развитие событий. Но если говорить о текущей ситуации, то, на мой взгляд, ни юридических, ни фактических предпосылок для этого нет. Собственно, с этим были связаны мои указы о признании новых субъектов международного права, а не о чём‑то другом. И мне кажется, что это нормальный путь развития добрососедских, дружеских отношений между Российской Федерацией, Абхазией и Южной Осетией. Это нормальный путь. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I think that no legal preconditions for this exist at the present moment. Of course it is impossible to anticipate what will happen in the future; events may develop in various ways. But if one speaks of the current situation, then in my view there are neither legal nor factual preconditions for this. My decrees on the recognition of new subjects of international law were in fact connected with this, and not with something else. And it seems to me that this is a normal path for the development of good-neighborly, friendly relations among the Russian Federation, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. It is a normal path. |
| А.Венедиктов: То есть то, что все жители Южной Осетии – российские граждане и голосуют за Президента Медведева, это не является юридической предпосылкой для вхождения в состав Российской Федерации? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: So, the fact that all residents of South Ossetia are Russian citizens and vote for President Medvedev, is this not a legal prerequisite for joining the Russian Federation? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: You said the decision to continue the operation in Georgia was a difficult one, that some of your aides tried to talk you out of it. Since the war ended, Russia has allocated 40 billion rubles’ worth of humanitarian aid to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is a huge amount of money that could have been used to resolve certain problems in Russia. What is Russia trying to achieve by giving that aid? |
| Д.Медведев: Это как минимум создаёт определённую ситуацию на территории Южной Осетии, но я не знаю, например, что будет через 15–20 лет, какими будут жители Южной Осетии, сколько там будет граждан России, а сколько будет граждан, собственно, самой Южной Осетии, будет ли у нас двойное гражданство или что‑то иное? Поэтому я бы не хотел забегать вперёд. В настоящий момент, подчёркиваю, правовых предпосылок для этого нет. Но жизнь есть жизнь, она развивается. Дмитрий Анатольевич, Вы сами сказали, что знали: признание будет происходить очень медленно. Действительно, оно происходит очень медленно, только три страны признали на сегодняшний день независимость Абхазии и Осетии. Понятно, что на бытовом уровне это вызывает массу неудобств для граждан этих республик. Например, элементарная поездка за границу может быть проблематичной. Готовы ли Вы дать всем гражданам этих республик, помочь им, российские заграничные паспорта? |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: This at a minimum creates a certain situation on the territory of South Ossetia, but I do not know, for example, what will be in 15–20 years, what the inhabitants of South Ossetia will be like, how many citizens of Russia there will be there and how many citizens of South Ossetia itself, whether we will have dual citizenship or something else. So I would not want to run ahead. At the present moment, I stress, there are no legal preconditions for this. But life is life; it develops. Dmitry Anatolyevich, you yourself said you knew that recognition would proceed very slowly. It is indeed proceeding very slowly; only three countries have to date recognized the independence of Abkhazia and Ossetia. It is clear that at the everyday level this causes a mass of inconvenience for the citizens of these republics. For example, an elementary trip abroad may be problematic. Are you prepared to give Russian foreign passports to all the citizens of these republics, to help them? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Alexei Venediktov: Mr President, you have said that Saakashvili should face an international tribunal. I would like you to elaborate on that. Should heads of state face international trials? The recent trial of [[Egypt's]] Hosni Mubarak in an international tribunal. How do you feel about it? Does it set a legal precedent? ”Our colleagues in Georgia are trying to force on us a new edition of the political problem under the guise of WTO accession. Our position on this is clear: if you want information about the traffic of goods, we will provide it. However, if they try to change current political realities, serving it as a prerequisite for Russia’s WTO accession, we will not fall for it.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Если они будут обращаться, а многие обращаются, мы, конечно, будем идти им навстречу, это очевидно, и будем давать паспорта, если они граждане России, конечно. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: If they apply, and many do apply, we will of course meet them halfway; that is obvious, and we will issue passports if they are citizens of Russia, of course. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Вы также сказали, что, когда Вы принимали это решение, даже Ваше близкое окружение Вам говорило, что, может быть, не надо, может быть, надо задуматься. И в России, и в Грузии возникает вопрос. С начала окончания войны в помощь Абхазии и Осетии было выделено Россией около 40 миллиардов рублей. Это действительно огромные деньги, которые можно было бы направить на решение каких‑то социальных проблем внутри страны. Зачем это России? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: You also said that when you made this decision, even your close circle told you that perhaps you shouldn't, perhaps you should think about it. In Russia and in Georgia, the question arises. Since the end of the war, Russia allocated about 40 billion rubles to assist Abkhazia and Ossetia. These are truly huge sums that could have been directed to solving certain social problems within the country. Why does Russia need this? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Having said that, does Russia believe an international tribunal should be founded to look into the events of August 2008? |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, у нас существует масса программ помощи и поддержки других стран. А это для нас, может быть, сейчас одни из самых близких государств, которые действительно в настоящий момент от нас всецело зависят. Это близкие нам государства, и там живут наши граждане, мы сейчас с вами об этом говорим. Уж если мы выделяем помощь государствам, в которых живут иностранные граждане, граждане соответствующих государств, то уж тем более есть смысл выделять деньги на поддержку и развитие обособленных территорий, имеющих международную правосубъектность, с нашей точки зрения, где живут российские граждане. Это нормально. Мы раньше вообще чёрт знает кому помогали, я имею в виду Советский Союз. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, we have a mass of programs of aid and support for other countries. And these are for us, perhaps, now some of the closest states, which at the present moment really do depend on us entirely. These are states close to us, and our citizens live there; we are talking about this now. If we allocate aid to states in which foreign citizens live, citizens of the states in question, then there is all the more sense in allocating money to the support and development of separate territories that have international legal personality, from our point of view, where Russian citizens live. This is normal. In the past we helped the devil knows whom; I mean the Soviet Union. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, Вы говорили о том, что необходимо Президента Саакашвили привлечь к суду, возможно, международному, если мне не изменяет память. Если я неправильно говорю, Вы меня поправьте. Я вообще хотел бы чуть расширить этот вопрос, сказать о допустимости привлечения лидеров государств к международному суду. Сегодня начался судебный процесс над Мубараком (мы все видели это), международный трибунал. Вообще, если говорить об этом, как Вы к этому относитесь? Это прецеденты? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, you spoke about the need to bring President Saakashvili to court, possibly an international one, if I am not mistaken. If I am speaking incorrectly, please correct me. I would generally like to expand on this question slightly and speak about the admissibility of bringing state leaders to an international court. Today, the trial of Mubarak has begun (we all saw this), an international tribunal. Generally, if we speak about this, how do you feel about it? Are these precedents? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: But, Mr President, I just want you to understand that Georgia’s biggest problem right now is 500,000 refugees. |
| 13 WTO Accession and Refusal of a Georgian "Barter" | |
| Д.Медведев: Да. Скажу. Вообще отношусь к этому юридически. Здесь уже безотносительно к Саакашвили или к кому‑то другому. Если существует международный трибунал, который создан по инициативе одного, нескольких государств и который поддержан международным сообществом, это возможно. Но если это некий волюнтаризм, просто желание решить политические проблемы за счёт смещения лидера при помощи какой‑то международной процедуры, то я против этого. Собственно говоря, в этом и различие. Под тему вступления в ВТО грузинские коллеги пытаются протолкнуть новое издание политической проблемы. Наша позиция проста: если вы хотите знать о движении товаров – мы готовы такую информацию давать. Но если под марку вступления в ВТО нам пытаются протолкнуть изменения существующих политических реалий, то мы, конечно, на это не пойдём. Например, если по тому или иному случаю был бы создан международный трибунал, как это происходило в истории человечества, я считаю, что у этого трибунала есть и юридическая компетенция, и, если хотите, высшая справедливость чинить суд над главой государства. Но если это просто чьи‑то выдумки, высосанные из пальца предложения по изменению политического устройства государства, то я категорически против этого. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Yes. I will say it. In general I take a legal attitude to this. Here it is already irrespective of Saakashvili or of anyone else. If there exists an international tribunal created on the initiative of one state or of several, and supported by the international community, that is possible. But if this is a certain voluntarism, simply a wish to solve political problems by displacing a leader with the help of some international procedure, then I am against it. That, properly speaking, is the difference. Under the heading of joining the WTO, our Georgian colleagues are trying to push through a new edition of a political problem. Our position is simple: if you want to know about the movement of goods, we are ready to provide such information. But if, under the cover of joining the WTO, they try to push through on us changes in the existing political realities, then we will of course not go along with that. For example, if in one case or another an international tribunal had been created, as has happened in the history of humanity, I consider that this tribunal has both the legal competence and, if you like, the higher justice to sit in judgment on a head of state. But if these are simply someone's inventions, proposals sucked out of a finger for changing the political order of a state, then I am categorically against it. |
| А.Венедиктов: В этой связи про Саакашвили. Считает ли Россия в лице её Президента, что должен быть создан международный трибунал по тому, что происходило в августе 2008 года? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: In this connection, regarding Saakashvili. Does Russia, in the person of its President, believe that an international tribunal should be established for what happened in August 2008? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Moving on. The question of Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation is very relevant these days. Russia wants in to the WTO, the WTO wants Russia. The problem, as far as we understand, is that Georgia is blocking Russia’s accession. It is the only country that’s not in favour of Russia joining the WTO. There has been talk about Georgia agreeing to Russia’s accession if Russia lifts its embargo on the import of Georgian goods or makes some other concessions. Is Russia willing to barter for it, and what is your take on the prospect of Russia joining the WTO? |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, если бы спросили меня, то я бы ответил: да, просто потому, я считаю, это было вопиющее нарушение норм международного права. Но с учётом того, что вряд ли здесь можно опираться только на позицию России, я думаю, что создание подобного трибунала в настоящий момент нереально, поэтому окончательный суд будет творить история, а промежуточный суд будут создавать избиратели Грузии, значит, они должны будут решать, как и куда развиваться. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, if I had been asked, I would have answered: yes, simply because I consider this was a flagrant violation of the norms of international law. But given that one can hardly rely here on Russia's position alone, I think that creating such a tribunal at the present moment is unrealistic, so history will render the final judgment, and an interim judgment will be made by the voters of Georgia; that means they will have to decide how to develop, and in what direction. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: В Грузии сейчас главной проблемой остаётся наличие полумиллиона беженцев. Дмитрий Анатольевич, я хочу, чтобы просто Вы это понимали. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: In Georgia the main problem remains the presence of half a million refugees. Dmitry Anatolyevich, I want you to simply understand this. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Taking that into account, what do you think are the chances of Russia joining the WTO before the end of 2011? |
| Д.Медведев: Понимаю. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I understand. |
| 14 International Tribunals — Legitimate Only If Not Political | |
| Е.Котрикадзе: О другом. Вопрос Всемирной торговой организации очень актуален в последнее время. Россия стремится в ВТО, ВТО хочет, чтобы Россия вступила в эту организацию, но при этом возникает проблема, насколько нам понятно, Грузия является единственной страной, которая блокирует вступление России в ВТО. Начались спекуляции относительно того, что, возможно, Россия вступит в ВТО, если будет отменено эмбарго на грузинскую продукцию в России, если будут какие‑то другие уступки. Господин Президент, как Вы оцениваете перспективы вступления России в ВТО и насколько реально получить какой‑то обмен, бартер? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: On another matter. The question of the World Trade Organization is very relevant in recent times. Russia is striving to join the WTO, the WTO wants Russia to join this organization, but at the same time there arises a problem, namely, how well we understand that Georgia is the only country that is blocking Russia's accession to the WTO. Speculations have begun regarding the fact that, perhaps, Russia will join the WTO if the embargo on Georgian products in Russia is lifted, if there will be some other concessions. Mr President, how do you assess the prospects for Russia's accession to the WTO and how realistic is it to obtain some exchange, barter? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: But the chances are high? |
| Д.Медведев: Вы очень точно выразили эту ситуацию. Бартера я бы точно не хотел, это было бы просто аморально. У Грузии есть отдельная позиция по этому поводу. Как и к любой страновой позиции, мы к ней относимся с уважением, если речь идёт о позиции, продиктованной уставными целями Всемирной торговой организации: торговля, преференции, режимы таможенные – всё готовы обсуждать абсолютно. Вино, минеральную воду – пожалуйста. Но сейчас, к сожалению, всё упирается в другое – по сути, под тему вступления в ВТО нам наши грузинские коллеги пытаются протолкнуть новое издание политической проблемы, а именно: пункты пропуска, кто чего контролирует, давайте позовём туда Евросоюз. Наша позиция простая: если вы хотите знать о движении товаров, в том числе транзитных товаров через территорию Осетии Южной, Абхазии, мы готовы такую информацию давать, причём в электронном виде, самым современным образом. Я, кстати, об этом договорился с Президентом Швейцарии, а вчера об этом говорил, кстати, с Президентом Обамой. В этом смысле мы готовы идти на швейцарские предложения. Но если под марку вступления в ВТО нам пытаются протолкнуть изменения существующих политических реалий, то мы, конечно, на это не пойдём. И здесь даже ВТО не будет той ценой, которая может быть заплачена. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You have expressed this situation very exactly. I would certainly not want barter; that would simply be immoral. Georgia has a separate position on this. As with any country's position, we treat it with respect if the talk is of a position dictated by the statutory purposes of the World Trade Organization: trade, preferences, customs regimes — we are ready to discuss absolutely everything. Wine, mineral water — please. But now, unfortunately, everything comes down to something else: in essence, under the heading of joining the WTO, our Georgian colleagues are trying to push through on us a new edition of a political problem, namely checkpoints, who controls what; let us invite the European Union there. Our position is simple: if you want to know about the movement of goods, including transit goods across the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, we are ready to provide such information, and in electronic form, in the most modern way. I, by the way, agreed on this with the President of Switzerland, and yesterday I spoke of it, by the way, with President Obama. In this sense we are ready to go along with the Swiss proposals. But if, under the cover of joining the WTO, they try to push through on us changes in the existing political realities, then we will of course not go along with that. And here even the WTO will not be the price that can be paid. |
| А.Венедиктов: Как Вы расцениваете, исходя из этих сложностей, возможность всё‑таки вступления в ВТО России до конца года? |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: How do you assess, given these difficulties, the possibility of Russia's accession to the WTO by the end of the year? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Mr President, if you will excuse a somewhat menial question. It’s about visas. I have a lot of Russian friends who go to Georgia for their vacations. They get their visas in the airport on arrival. On the other hand, I cannot invite any of my Georgian friends to Russia. Even inviting relatives to Russia is a problem. Do you have any plans to relax the visa regime with Georgia in the near future? ”It is important for us to move on from this sad chapter of our relations. We should remember what happened, but be focused on the future. We should restore the strong bonds that existed between the Russian and Georgian people. These bonds should be restored completely, but Russia cannot do it on its own.“ |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, я считаю, что шансы довольно высокие, потому что мы все на эту тему много работаем. Я работаю со своими коллегами и внутри страны, создаю различного рода стимулы за пределами, разговариваю с иностранными руководителями. Я считаю, если грузинское руководство в данном случае проявит мудрость… А мне кажется, это, кстати, один из тех моментов, который сейчас мог бы стать если не поворотной точкой, то, во всяком случае, точкой соприкосновения, вокруг которой можно было бы в дальнейшем начать восстановление сначала нормальных торгово-экономических отношений, а потом уже, глядишь, и дипломатических отношений. Я напомню, мы же дипломатические отношения не прерывали, это была позиция наших грузинских коллег, то есть в этом смысле я считаю, что это было бы неплохо. Но здесь шарик на их стороне. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I consider the chances fairly high, because we are all working a great deal on this subject. I work with my colleagues inside the country as well, I create various kinds of incentives beyond its borders, I talk with foreign leaders. I consider that if the Georgian leadership shows wisdom in this case… And it seems to me, by the way, that this is one of those moments that could now become, if not a turning point, then at any rate a point of contact around which one could later begin to restore first normal trade and economic relations and then, in time, diplomatic relations too. I will remind you: we did not break off diplomatic relations; that was the position of our Georgian colleagues, so in that sense I consider that this would not be bad. But here the ball is on their side. |
| А.Венедиктов: Но шансы высокие? Самое главное, чтобы мы, перевернув эту печальную страницу, помнили о том, что произошло, но смотрели в будущее, чтобы мы восстановили те огромные связи, которые существовали между русским народом, жителями России, и грузинским народом, чтобы мы восстановили добрососедские человеческие контакты в полном объёме. Но здесь не всё зависит от России. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: But are the chances high? The most important thing is that we, having turned this sad page, remember what happened, but look to the future, so that we restore those huge ties that existed between the Russian people, the residents of Russia, and the Georgian people, so that we restore friendly human contacts in full. But here everything does not depend on Russia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: I wanted to ask if you had friends in Georgia. Have you ever visited Georgia? |
| Д.Медведев: Я считаю, что высокие. Но, конечно, здесь есть политические преграды. Если они в какой‑то момент сработают, то тогда мы можем оказаться отброшенными к началу переговорного периода. Это будет плохо для всех, включая, естественно, саму ВТО. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I think they are high. But of course there are political obstacles here. If at some point they come into play, then we may find ourselves thrown back to the beginning of the negotiating period. That will be bad for everyone, including, naturally, the WTO itself. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Дмитрий Анатольевич, а можно бытовой вопрос Вам задать? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Dmitry Anatolyevich, may I ask you a personal question? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: Mr President, I have a question about Russian-Georgian relations, but not the recent conflict. Some media have reported that the CIA has confirmed Georgia’s version about the bombing of the US embassy in Tbilisi being organised by Russia’s special services, as well as a number of other bombings in Georgia. Some media have reported that some world leaders have confronted you about this. Can you confirm this? |
| Д.Медведев: Конечно, можно. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Of course one may. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: То, что касается виз. Российские граждане, у меня куча друзей, которые каждое лето ездят в Грузию, получают грузинские визы прямо в аэропорту. А я, к сожалению, не могу пригласить ни своих друзей, и даже приглашение членам семьи очень проблематично. Есть ли в Ваших планах как‑то облегчить визовый режим? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Regarding visas: Russian citizens, I have many friends who travel to Georgia every summer and obtain Georgian visas directly at the airport. Unfortunately, I cannot invite my friends, and even inviting family members is very problematic. Do you have any plans to ease the visa regime? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: A question about Abkhazia, Mr President. Every answer you give prompts two more questions. Saakashvili started the war with South Ossetia. But why did we recognise Abkhazia? Georgian troops did not enter it, no one died, a war did not break out there, but we recognised Abkhazia as well. Why is that? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified | Ekaterina Kotrikadze: The second frontline was actually in Abkhazia. |
| Д.Медведев: Я бы с удовольствием это сделал хоть завтра. Вопрос именно в том, что я сказал до этого. Проблема в том, что нет сейчас субъекта для переговоров. Но вообще‑то, если будут разумные предложения, мы готовы и это рассмотреть, не от Саакашвили, но в целом от грузинского руководства мы готовы, естественно, рассматривать и такие предложения. Вы знаете, ведь не так давно мы даже не имели нормального сообщения самолётами. Сейчас более или менее восстановили, и ничего, всё летает, всё движется. Надо двигаться в этом направлении. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I would gladly have done this even tomorrow. The question is precisely the one I stated before this. The problem is that there is now no party with whom to negotiate. But in general, if reasonable proposals appear, we are ready to consider this too — not from Saakashvili, but from the Georgian leadership as a whole we are of course ready to consider such proposals as well. You know, not so long ago we did not even have a normal air service. Now we have more or less restored it, and it is all right: everything is flying, everything is moving. One must move in that direction. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Меня ещё интересует, есть у Вас лично друзья в Грузии и бывали ли Вы когда‑нибудь в этой стране? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: I am also interested: do you personally have friends in Georgia, and have you ever been to this country? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: So you think they were planning to attack Abkhazia as well? |
| Д.Медведев: Вы знаете, в этом смысле моя ситуация такая. У меня, конечно, есть товарищи из Грузии. Я даже не знаю, где они сейчас, по‑моему, всё‑таки значительная часть их живёт в России. Мы когда‑то учились на юридическом факультете, симпатичные, приятные люди, у меня всегда с ними были прекрасные отношения. Что касается моих личных ощущений. Вы знаете, мне, к сожалению, до того, как всё это произошло, удалось побывать только в Абхазии, это было в 1990 году. Собственно, после этого всё и началось. Вы знаете, у меня потом были мрачные ощущения. Я как раз приехал в Сочи и со своим приятелем поехал в Грузию, тогда в единую, мы немножко покатались по Абхазии, посмотрели красивые места, вернулись, и спустя год начались все эти сложные события. Мне было так жалко. Такая красивая республика, люди такие красивые, гостеприимные. И из‑за всего того, что там происходит, туда даже поехать нельзя. Это были мои первые эмоции в отношении событий, которые начались в 95-м. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, my situation in this sense is this. I of course have comrades from Georgia. I do not even know where they are now; in my view a significant part of them lives in Russia all the same. We once studied in the law faculty; agreeable, pleasant people, and I always had excellent relations with them. As for my personal feelings. You know, unfortunately, before all this happened I managed to visit only Abkhazia; that was in 1990. In fact everything began after that. You know, I afterward had gloomy feelings. I had just arrived in Sochi and went to Georgia with a friend, then a single Georgia; we drove around Abkhazia a little, looked at beautiful places, came back, and a year later all these difficult events began. I felt so sorry. Such a beautiful republic, such beautiful, hospitable people. And because of everything going on there, one cannot even travel there. These were my first emotions about the events that began in 95. |
| 15 Denials — "Northern Cyprus" Plan and Embassy Bombings | |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Дмитрий Анатольевич, у меня вопрос по российско-грузинским отношениям, не касающийся, собственно, войны и конфликта. Некоторые западные СМИ пишут о том, что ЦРУ США подтверждает версию грузинской стороны о взрыве у посольства США в Тбилиси. А версия грузинской стороны заключается в том, что этот взрыв был организован российскими спецслужбами, равно как и ряд других взрывов на территории Грузии. Пишут также западные СМИ о том, что некоторые лидеры, опять же западных стран, беседовали с Вами на этот счёт. Если можно, подтвердите или опровергните. Я Вам говорю предельно прямо: ни один лидер ни одной страны ни разу на эту тему не заикался. Может быть, это будет даже немножко обидно для Грузии, но я Вам честно скажу: сейчас вообще эта тема отсутствует в повестке дня моих переговоров с европейскими лидерами, её вообще просто нет. Действительно, она была сложной в 2008 году, потому что был конфликт. Сейчас её просто не существует. Есть один вопрос – ВТО. Да, его мы обсуждаем в основном с американцами, немножко с европейцами. Что касается этих взрывов, это всё чушь, вранье и провокация. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Dmitry Anatolyevich, I have a question about Russian-Georgian relations, not concerning the war and conflict itself. Some Western media report that the CIA of the United States confirms the Georgian side's version of the explosion at the US embassy in Tbilisi. The Georgian side's version is that this explosion was organized by Russian intelligence services, just as a number of other explosions on Georgian territory. Western media also report that some leaders, again of Western countries, have spoken with you on this matter. If possible, please confirm or deny. I am speaking to you with extreme directness: no leader of any country has ever mentioned this topic. It may even be slightly offensive to Georgia, but I will tell you honestly: currently, this topic is simply absent from the agenda of my negotiations with European leaders; it does not exist at all. Indeed, it was complicated in 2008 because there was a conflict. Now it simply does not exist. There is one issue – the WTO. Yes, we discuss it mainly with Americans, a little with Europeans. As for these explosions, it is all nonsense, lies, and provocation. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: You know, Mr President, children are usually very direct when they ask you questions. |
| А.Венедиктов: Дмитрий Анатольевич, Абхазия. Каждый Ваш ответ вызывает два вопроса. Это очень опасная история. С чем она связана? Да, Саакашвили начал войну с Осетией. Собственно говоря, почему мы признали Абхазию? Грузинские войска не входили в Абхазию, там не погиб ни один человек, там не началась война, но мы признали Абхазию тоже. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Dmitry Anatolyevich, Abkhazia. Every one of your answers raises two questions. This is a very dangerous story. What is it connected with? Yes, Saakashvili started a war with Ossetia. In fact, why did we recognize Abkhazia? Georgian troops did not enter Abkhazia, not a single person died there, no war started there, but we also recognized Abkhazia. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Do you have a child’s outlook on life? |
| Е.Котрикадзе: И фактически там был второй фронт. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: And in fact there was a second front there. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: I do and I am proud of it. |
| Д.Медведев: Знаете, я думаю, что ответ на этот вопрос абсолютно очевиден: невозможно было признать одно обособленное территориальное образование, не признав другого. Это означало бы следующее: вы на Южную Осетию напали, и мы признали их правосубъектность, теперь нападайте на Абхазию, и тогда мы их тоже признаем. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You know, I think the answer to this question is absolutely obvious: it was impossible to recognize one separate territorial formation without recognizing the other. That would have meant the following: you attacked South Ossetia, and we recognized their legal personality; now attack Abkhazia, and then we will recognize them too. |
| 16 Personal Feelings and a Message to Georgians | |
| Е.Котрикадзе: То есть был план нападения на Абхазию, на Ваш взгляд? |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: So there was a plan to attack Abkhazia, in your opinion? |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Yes. In that sense, yes. I will ask you a simple question: are you proud of what you did in 2008, are you ashamed, do you suffer because of it? Now that three years have passed, how would you describe your emotions? |
| Д.Медведев: А я в этом абсолютно уверен, более того, Южная Осетия – это такое «слабое звено», маленькое, с небольшим населением, может быть, менее устойчивое. «Давайте попробуем силы там, а если прокатит, тогда попробуем восстановить конституционный правопорядок на территории Абхазии». Не «прокатило», и это фатальная ошибка. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: And I am absolutely certain of this; moreover, South Ossetia is a kind of "weak link," small, with a small population, perhaps less stable. "Let us try our strength there, and if it works, then we will try to restore constitutional order on the territory of Abkhazia." It did not "work," and that is a fatal mistake. |
| А.Венедиктов: Знаете, Дмитрий Анатольевич, дети обычно спрямляют вопросы. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: You know, Dmitry Anatolyevich, children usually straighten out questions. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Moving on, and perhaps to wrap this up, a recent poll conducted in Russia indicates that 39% of Russians believe a second war with Georgia is possible. I don’t know what the figure is for Georgia… |
| Д.Медведев: У Вас детское восприятие жизни? |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Do you have a childlike perception of life? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: People have not been polled about this, but you can feel that the possibility is discussed. |
| А.Венедиктов: У меня абсолютно детское восприятие жизни, чем и горжусь. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: I have an absolutely childlike perception of life, and I am proud of it. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Ever since the first war ended. |
| Д.Медведев: Вы счастливый человек. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: You are a happy person. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Ekaterina Kotrikadze: It is being discussed all the time. |
| 6 Recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia — No Regrets | |
| А.Венедиктов: Да, в этом смысле – да. Скажите, пожалуйста, я, конечно, упрощу: Вы гордитесь тем, что Вы сделали в августе 2008 года, или Вы стыдитесь, или Вам больно? Как Вы сформулируете свою эмоцию по прошествии трёх лет? Тогда – понятно. По прошествии трёх лет? Я попробую выразить… Скажу так: мне больно от того, что произошло тогда, до сих пор, но я считаю, что и решение о применении силы, и последующее признание двух этих территорий в качестве субъектов международного права были абсолютно правильными. И в этом смысле я считаю, что действовал в рамках Конституции, и за свои поступки мне не только не стыдно – я считаю, что это были правомерные, разумные, необходимые решения. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: Yes, in that sense – yes. Please tell me, I will simplify: are you proud of what you did in August 2008 of the year, or are you ashamed, or does it hurt you? How will you formulate your emotion after three years have passed? Then – understood. After three years? I will try to express... I will say this: I am hurt by what happened then, and still am, but I believe that both the decision to use force and the subsequent recognition of these two territories as subjects of international law were absolutely correct. And in this sense, I believe that I acted within the Constitution, and I am not only not ashamed of my actions – I believe that these were lawful, reasonable, necessary decisions. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Alexei Venediktov: Not just by politicians either. Taxi drivers are talking about it. |
| А.Венедиктов: Как последствие этого и, может быть, последняя тема. Недавно был опрос ВЦИОМа или ФОМа, не вспомню, 39 процентов россиян считают, что возможна новая война между Россией и Грузией. В Грузии, я не знаю… |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: As a consequence of this and, perhaps, the last topic. Recently there was a poll by VTsIOM or FOM, I don't remember, 39 percent of Russians believe that a new war between Russia and Georgia is possible. In Georgia, I don't know... |
| Д.Медведев: Сколько, кстати? |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: How many, by the way? |
| Е.Котрикадзе: В Грузии опросов не проводили такого рода, опасаются ли люди второй войны, но однозначно чувствуется, что эта тема не теряет актуальности. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: In Georgia, no such surveys have been conducted to see whether people fear a second war, but it is unequivocally felt that this topic does not lose its relevance. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: What can you say to the Georgian people regarding this? |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Причём с момента окончания войны. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: And since the end of the war. |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: This would be a very appropriate thing to do at the end of this interview. First, I hope that our countries never engage in armed conflicts again, even during Mr Saakashvili’s term in office. I think he has learned his lesson. Secondly, it is important for us to move on from this sad chapter of our relations. We should remember what happened, but be focused on the future. We should restore the strong bonds that existed between the Russian and Georgian people. These bonds still exist, you are living proof of that. You live in the two countries; you visit both Georgia and Russia. But I would like to see these connections restored completely. I would like to see it happen as soon as possible. It would not only be beneficial for the two countries. It is, if you will, a call of the heart. I mean this sincerely. I would like to see it happen soon. We can make it happen if we work, but Russia cannot do it on its own. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: Да, с момента окончания войны всё время постоянно в Грузии обсуждают возможность, вероятность второй войны с Россией. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: Yes, since the end of the war, the possibility and probability of a second war with Russia have been constantly discussed in Georgia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Sophie Shevardnadze: Thank you very much. |
| А.Венедиктов: Причём, знаете, что интересно, я неделю был в Грузии, не только на уровне политиков, политики ведут политику… |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: And, you know, what's interesting, I was in Georgia for a week, not only at the level of politicians, politicians conduct politics... |
| Matching Russian passage has not been identified |
Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Thank you. |
| Е.Котрикадзе: На уровне таксистов. |
Full house translation — pending review Е.Котрикадзе: At the level of taxi drivers. |
| А.Венедиктов: …на уровне таксистов, на бытовом уровне. |
Full house translation — pending review А.Венедиктов: ...at the level of taxi drivers, at the everyday level. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Что бы Вы грузинскому народу могли бы сказать по этому поводу? |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: What would you like to say to the Georgian people about this? |
| Д.Медведев: Я считаю, что это было бы очень правильным в завершение интервью сделать. Во‑первых, я очень надеюсь на то, что между нашими странами никогда никаких конфликтов больше не будет, даже в период пребывания у власти господина Саакашвили, потому что он получил хороший урок. Это первое. Второе. Самое главное, чтобы мы, перевернув эту печальную страницу, помнили о том, что произошло, но смотрели в будущее, чтобы мы восстановили те огромные связи, которые существовали между русским народом, жителями России, и грузинским народом, чтобы мы восстановили добрососедские человеческие контакты в полном объёме. Они и сейчас есть. И вы как раз пример такого рода контактов – вы живёте, бываете и здесь, и там. Но мне бы хотелось, чтобы они были восстановлены в полном объёме. И мне бы очень хотелось, чтобы это произошло как можно быстрее. Это не просто выгодно для двух стран. Это, если хотите, зов сердца. Я говорю предельно искренне: мне бы хотелось, чтобы это произошло как можно быстрее. И если мы будем трудиться для этого, то мы сможем эту задачу решить. Но здесь не всё зависит от России. |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: I believe that it would be very appropriate to conclude the interview with this. First of all, I sincerely hope that there will never be any more conflicts between our countries, even during the tenure of Mr. Saakashvili, because he has received a good lesson. That is the first point. Second. Most importantly, after turning over this sad page, we must remember what happened but look to the future, so that we restore the huge ties that existed between the Russian people, the residents of Russia, and the Georgian people, so that we restore full-scale friendly human contacts. They exist now as well. And you are exactly an example of such contacts – you live, sometimes being here and there. But I would like them to be restored in full scale. And I would very much like for this to happen as soon as possible. This is not just beneficial for two countries. It is, if you will, a call of the heart. I speak with utmost sincerity: I would like for this to happen as soon as possible. And if we work towards this, then we can solve this task. But here not everything depends on Russia. |
| С.Шеварднадзе: Спасибо большое. |
Full house translation — pending review С.Шеварднадзе: Thank you very much. |
| Д.Медведев: Вам большое спасибо. Темы Внешняя политика |
Full house translation — pending review Д.Медведев: Thank you very much. Topics Foreign policy |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I think it is possible to help them, but that would require action aimed at finally restoring peace, so that Abkhazians, Georgians and Ossetians could engage in civilized dialogue. That would enable them to deal even with the most complex challenges, including the issue of refugees, or the issue of entry and transit. All of these matters are secondary to the conflict that took place almost exactly three years ago. Therefore, diplomatic efforts, negotiation, and the willingness to listen to one another — these are the necessary prerequisites for resolving these issues. And on top of that, one also needs to recognize the reality that has emerged in the region as a result of the military gamble in 2008. ”It is required to take action aimed at finally restoring peace, so that Abkhazians, Georgians and Ossetians could engage in civilized dialogue. That would enable them to deal even with the most complex challenges. Therefore, diplomatic efforts, negotiation, and the willingness to listen to one another — these are the necessary prerequisites for resolving these issues.“ |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: You know, Ekaterina, I had the same impression at that time. I can still recall meeting President Saakashvili for the first time. It was in St Petersburg. We met in the Constantine Palace, and as Mr Saakashvili arrived, I told him, literally: “You know, there are many problems in the region at the moment. Georgia is at odds with these unrecognized states. But I can assure you as a newly elected President of Russia that I shall do everything in my capacity to help you find some compromise solutions that would accommodate everyone, and would eventually facilitate reintegration of Georgian territory. If that is acceptable for all the parties engaged in negotiation, naturally.” That is what I told him, word for word. His response was, “But of course, we are ready to co-operate.” And I also had this impression that we could at least try to find some creative solutions, if not open a new chapter entirely. But first of all, there was an opportunity to meet on a regular basis. What happened later on? We held meetings, we had conversations. As far as I remember, our last meeting took place in Astana. There, we agreed that we would sit down and have a serious discussion. And the venue for that would be right here, in Sochi. I told Mr Saakashvili: “Come to Sochi, and we will have a sensible discussion on all of our issues.” By that time, Mr Saakashvili had started going on about Georgia’s problems and his perception of the situation, and I explained Russia’s opinion for him. But since we were in Astana at the time, marking its anniversary, I invited Mr Saakashvili to come to Russia. And he said, “Alright, I am ready to do this.” I can tell you earnestly, I spent the next month checking regularly for any feedback from our Georgian counterpart. There was nothing. But at the same time, Georgia was getting more and more visits from ‘envoys from across the ocean’, as they would be dubbed in Soviet-speak. The moment of truth for me, as I realized later while analysing those events in hindsight over and over again, came with the visit by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Following that visit, my Georgian colleague simply dropped all communication with us. He simply stopped talking to us, he stopped writing letters and making phone calls. It was apparent that he had some new plans now. And those plans were implemented later. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: No, I don’t think so. The United States is a very large country headed by pragmatic people. But in politics, connotations and nuances are very important. There was a time once, back when I was Head of the Presidential Administration, when I paid a visit to the White House and met with none other than Condi Rice and the then head of the President’s Executive Office. And at some point, we were joined by [President] George W.Bush. He simply walked in in a common casual manner, like “Hey, hello.” And the first thing he told me was, “You know, Misha Saakashvili is a great guy.” I said to him: “Mr President, I don’t know. I’ve never met him. Maybe I will one day.” Unfortunately, his words have proved to be darkly prophetic. Mind you, those were the very first words I heard from George Bush during our personal meeting. As it is, I don’t believe the Americans had urged Georgia’s president to invade. But I do believe that there were certain subtleties and certain hints made — statements like “It’s time to restore constitutional order,” or “It’s time to be more assertive,” — which could effectively feed Saakashvili’s apparent hopes that the Americans would back him in any conflict, that they would stand up for Georgia and even go to war with the Russians. Therefore, I do see a relation between Ms Rice’s visit to Georgia and the events that followed. Just as I see a link to my further discussions with the US president: our phone conversations and then our personal meetings. ”I don’t believe the Americans had urged Georgia’s president to invade. But I do believe that there were certain subtleties and certain hints made, statements which could effectively feed apparent hopes that the Americans would provide some backing in any conflict.“ |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Well, I would have to at least have some official information or intelligence reports to be able to make such a statement. I don’t have them. But we can make analysis: my Georgian counterpart ceased all communication with us following a visit by Condoleezza Rice. Maybe that was just a coincidence. But I’m almost absolutely sure that that was when they came up with a plan for the military gamble, which ensued in August 2008. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: That is just total bunk. Mr Saakashvili generally does a lot of talking, and he often loses control of what he is saying. There were no discussions of the kind — I would know, as I’ve been part of the government for over ten years. That’s number one. And secondly, conflicts are no good for anyone, ever. Those who say you can resolve something through violence are liars. Conflicts have never resulted in anything good. If we had managed to prevent this war, it would have been to everyone’s benefit, and Georgia’s in the first place. The fact that it didn’t happen is a real tragedy. And in my opinion, only one person is responsible for this — it’s just the way governments function — and that man is the President of Georgia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Exactly.) Looking back at the situation three years later, what would you have done in a different way? What is it that Russia failed to do in order to avoid the war? I can tell you frankly: had I realized back in July 2008 that Mr Saakashvili was nurturing such plans in his inflamed mind, maybe I would have addressed him in an even tougher way. And I would’ve tried to drag him out of his environment at home, get him to come to Russia, or some third country, in order to talk to him, simply talk him out of this. But of course, I had no idea. So when it all happened, even though we had been aware that there were plans in Georgia to ‘restore their territorial integrity’ through the use of force, I still thought it was a paranoid scenario that would never become reality. You always keep hoping that common sense will prevail over this kind of rationale. That is why I was surprised by what happened on August 8 th , and I’ve explained it many times: I realized that by unleashing this war, Saakashvili had personally devoted his country to destruction. And that is the scariest part, both for him and for the Georgian people. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Well, what can I say? First of all, he is a difficult man to evade, because he can stick to you like a barnacle. If he wants to get hold of you, he will do a fair job of it. He approached me several times and we spoke. I remember it clearly: we talked while sitting on a bus and we talked while taking a walk in a park. I’ll tell you more. In the evening, we went out for a cup of tea and a glass of wine. And even there, we sat on a sofa and kept discussing the prospect of a meeting. So Saakashvili is making this up. Let it lie on his conscience, along with many other things. ”Conflicts are no good for anyone. Those who say you can resolve something through violence are liars. If we had managed to prevent this war, it would have been to everyone’s benefit, and Georgia’s in the first place. Only one person is responsible for this tragedy and that man is the President of Georgia.“ |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I did it only because Saakashvili had committed a crime against the Russian Federation and its nationals. Hundreds of our citizens were killed on his orders, including Russian peacekeepers. I will never forgive him for that, and I will not talk to him, even though he occasionally tries winking at me at various international fora. I can talk to anyone else, no problem. We can discuss any issues — of course, as long as we observe the present international legal status of the region, and stay within the context of the decisions I’ve had to take. And believe me, those were very hard decisions. But Mr Saakashvili is a person I’ll never shake hands with. I realize that he is the legally elected president of Georgia, and it is only up to the Georgian people to grant or deny him a vote of confidence. Anyway, I am confident about one thing: sooner or later, Mikheil Saakashvili will no longer be president of Georgia. Such are the rules of politics. And whoever becomes the next president in Georgia, they will have a chance to restore positive and beneficial relations with Russia. Moreover, I can tell you personally that it is absolutely painful for me to see that our countries lack positive relations, because we are very close as nations and as people. If not for this dimwit gamble of 2008, we could have kept up our dialogue for years, despite all of its political complexities, and we could have eventually arrived at a solution that would be acceptable for everybody, including the Georgians and the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. That is exactly what I’ll never forgive Saakashvili for. And I think that the Georgian people ought to express their assessment of Saakashvili, but do it through a democratic process. Wrapping up our discussion on Saakashvili, I can tell you this: he should actually be thankful to me for halting our troops at some point. If they had marched into Tbilisi, Georgia would most likely have a different president by now. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: A bunch? Oh no, I’ve already said a lot.) Why did you decide not to march on Tbilisi? I believe that the peace enforcement operation, which took five days, was a mission accomplished. Our mission was not to capture Tbilisi or any other city in Georgia. Our only objective was to halt the invasion that Saakashvili had unleashed. Besides, I’m neither a judge nor an executioner. I’d like to stress once again that it is up to the people of Georgia to assess Saakashvili and decide his fate through a democratic vote or other means, the way it sometimes happens in history. But deposing Saakashvili by force wasn’t on my agenda back then, and I can tell you earnestly I still think it was the right decision. Even though it would’ve been a piece of cake. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: You know, Sophie, people are free to make speculations like that, and I have come across them many times. But try putting yourself in the shoes of Russia’s Commander-in-Chief — my shoes, that is. Sure, we could have merely forced them out and stopped there. But what were we hearing from Georgia? “We shall fall back to our initial position, and our American friends and their allies will help us re-arm ourselves, get us new aircraft and other, and then we shall resume the same offensive with renewed vigour.” Letting them do that would have been a crime against the memory of those who died protecting their land. Therefore, our mission at the time was to destroy Georgia’s war machine, so that it wouldn’t be able to target civilians in Ossetia, Abkhazia and the Russian Federation — because, as you know, it’s all mixed there. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: You see, Alexei, it is always case by case. There are no identical countries, and there are no identical situations. I guess it’s clear to you what is going on in Libya: there’s a man who has been running the country for forty years, and at some point he decided to use force against his own people. This was condemned by the entire international community, including Russia. We are not taking part in the military campaign, whereas a few nations are attempting to instill order in Libya through military means. We don’t think it is the right thing to do, but there is one nuance you should keep in mind. Georgia had been split into three parts by the time of the war — it should’ve been about pulling the country back together for them rather than merely ‘restoring constitutional order’ — whereas Libya is still in one piece. Such a risk does exist for Libya, but so far all the parties to the conflict, including the so-called rebels and the pro-Gaddafi forces, have pledged to preserve their country’s territorial integrity. So the situations are quite different. However, I’m not saying this to explain how we make decisions. I am merely trying to demonstrate that all of these situations and scenarios are totally diverse. This goes for other countries as well. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Syria is a more complex issue, but, sadly, their situation has been unfolding in a very dramatic way so far. All of us practical politicians should keep a close watch of the developments in that country. Gaddafi, for one, had issued unequivocal orders to slaughter opposition activists. By contrast, Syria’s president never ordered anything like that. Unfortunately, people are dying in Syria in grave numbers, and that arouses our deepest concerns. Therefore, in my discussions with President al-Assad during our personal conversations and in our correspondence I have been advocating one principal idea: that he should immediately launch reforms, reconcile with the opposition, restore civil accord, and start developing a modern state. Should he fail to do that, he is in for a grim fate, and we will eventually have to take some decisions on Syria, too. Naturally, we have been watching developments very attentively. The situation is changing, and so are our objectives. Allow me to speak bluntly then: How is Saakashvili’s action on Tskhinval different from what Russia was doing to Grozny back in 1999? |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: This is a question I get to hear rather often. The difference is that Russia was not after the same objectives in Grozny as Georgia was in Tskhinval. We were pursuing a legitimate task of restoring order. We were not set on mass-killing our own people. We were fighting criminals: the people who defied a legitimate government, draping themselves with various slogans, from pseudo-Islamic notions to pure extremist propaganda. There was nothing of the kind in either South Ossetia or Abkhazia, since these two republics had long existed as self-proclaimed independent states which had their own governments and maintained some sort of law and order. These cases are essentially different. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I have explained my rationale for taking that decision on numerous occasions. You see, I didn’t look to any figures for motivation. This isn’t exactly a case for mathematics. Let me remind you what was going on there. On the night between August 7 th and August 8 th , I received a phone call from the defence minister. I was on vacation at the time, sailing down the Volga River. And the whole world was looking forward to the Olympics that were about to take off in China. The minister told me that Georgia had launched a full-scale combat operation. To be honest, my initial reaction was complete doubt. I told the minister: “We should check this. Is Saakashvili completely out of his mind? Maybe it’s just a provocative act, maybe he is stress-testing the Ossetians and trying to send us some kind of a message?” An hour later, the minister reported to me: “This is no bluff. They’ve unleashed an all-out artillery barrage, and they’re using Grad rocket launchers and what not.” I said, “Alright. I’ll wait for another update.” Some more time passed, and the minister called again: “I have something to tell you. They’ve just levelled a tent full of our peacekeepers, killing every one of them.” What was I supposed to do? I said: “Return fire and shoot to kill.” No figures had been announced at that point. Unfortunately, such situations are always about instant situation reports and instant decisions, and difficult ones too. I can tell you that was the hardest night of my life. Casualty estimates started coming in later. They did diverge indeed, and they still do. I am not a detective, nor a forensic expert. I don’t perform exhumations. Our Ossetian friends and colleagues tell us that many bodies were buried back then and remain missing to this date. Meanwhile, Georgian analysts present different estimates. But you know, we can’t use this kind of logic: two thousand lives is serious enough, and 150 does not even qualify as casualties… |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Some of them may have been away, certainly. But my answer to your question is — the number of casualties should never influence your decision on what retaliation measures you are going to take. If you are a sane person, that is. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: To be honest with you, no-one called anyone. The first time I contacted him about the conflict was about 24 hours after it had broken out. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Yes. I had already issued all the orders to the military. Tskhinval was already ablaze. Mr Putin just made a statement, condemning Tbilisi’s move. That was the right thing to do, of course. We spoke, twenty four hours after the attack over a secure line. As you understand, it’s not very appropriate to discuss matters like this by cellphone. It’s also a lot of trouble to establish a secure line connection with someone who is in a different country. We talked, and then we talked more when he came back. But even before his return I called a meeting of the Security Council. I explained my position, my decision to return fire and engage in conflict. Security Council members voiced their support for my decision. Some time later, we had a meeting in Sochi, which Mr Putin attended. That was how it went. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I can’t talk about him without a smile, unlike the other president we discussed today. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Because I like him . |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Of course not. No head of state is capable of talking another head of state into anything. Look at the world trying to talk Gaddafi into giving up. Have they persuaded him to do anything? No, and I don’t think they will. He would sooner die in his bunker. Let me stress this again: taking cities was never our goal. Our goal was to stop the war machine which was at the time aimed at two breakaway territories and, regrettably, at our citizens. What Sarkozy did was very kind. He called me and said: “I heard there was conflict, do you want me to fly over to Moscow?” I said I would be happy to see him. Then he told me: “I am currently chairing the EU. I could come over to discuss the incident.” He is very good at this sort of thing and he loves doing it. He came to Moscow and we talked. I explained my position to him. He told me: “I understand and I agree. Some things I will be able to say in public, some I won’t, but regardless of that, I want to have a part in stopping this conflict.” I told him: “All right, let’s put a plan together.” That plan was later called the Medvedev-Sarkozy ceasefire. I told him he could take the plan to Georgia. The best thing about what he did was probably that he had the courage to come to Russia at a time when literally everyone was talking about what we had done. He was brave enough to go on to Georgia with our initiatives and he garnered a satisfactory reaction from the Georgian authorities, President Saakashvili first and foremost. That was his contribution to the diplomatic cause that helped solve the conflict. To this day, I am very thankful to President Sarkozy for having done that. His role was very important but he never said anything like “maybe you should stop here.” He understood that my decisions were my own. His goal, of course, being to stop the conflict as soon as possible.“ I believe that the peace enforcement operation was a mission accomplished. Our mission was not to capture Tbilisi or any other city in Georgia. Our only objective was to halt the invasion that Saakashvili had unleashed. Deposing Saakashvili by force wasn’t on my agenda back then, even though it would’ve been a piece of cake. If the troops had marched into Tbilisi, Georgia would most likely have a different president by now. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Well I would not want him to bear responsibility for an executive order that I signed. He was not involved in the work on the executive order to recognise the two republics. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I can say that I never discussed the matter with him. He did not come to Moscow to discuss it. He was never involved in the matter. Of course, I can tell you that he and several other EU representatives disapproved of the decision. They told us we were creating problems for ourselves. I heard them, but pleasing our partners was not my priority when I made this decision. As for the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan, it was not about the breakaway republics. The plan was aimed at stopping the war that Saakashvili’s undertaking had caused. In that sense it was a complete success. Russia’s position on that is quite simple: the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan was carried out and it was successful. I consider all other interpretations of the events to be wrong. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I can tell you one thing. France has its own position and so does the EU. These positions are different from ours. We can’t do anything about it. They are just different. I believe I have fully completed the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. The plan said nothing about Russia not recognising Abkhazia or South Ossetia or anything of the sort. As for the retreat, our forces have retreated. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Yes, to what Russia believes to be their pre-war positions. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I think that, as the liberal leader of a modern and developing Russia, I can only give one possible answer. These statements are unfounded. They reflect the preferences of certain senior citizens in the Senate who, due to non-objective reasons, have aligned themselves with certain individuals. That's completely up to them. We are talking about a foreign parliament and I do not much care about how they phrase their statements. My position is different. It is embodied in the executive orders I signed over that difficult period. I will be frank with you, although you may disagree. I am not ashamed of having signed those executive orders. Not only am I not ashamed, I believe these decisions were much needed, and they were right. There was no other way to stop the tragedy. Those decisions were very difficult to make. I realised what sort of repercussions they might bring. I can tell you that I have had long discussions with my aides about these executive orders and we saw no obvious solution to the crisis at first. Nevertheless, I think the decisions I made were well thought-out. The essence of it was to recognise the territories as subjects to international law so we could protect them. As for what that might bring — a question that inevitably follows — no one knows. You know, I would be very happy if the Georgian, Abkhaz and South Ossetian authorities went to the negotiating table to discuss how they would continue living side by side. How peace and security would be enforced in the region; what the future holds for their closely-related peoples; what they could create together. I would be happy if it came to that. Russia would never obstruct such negotiations.“ |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Let me tell you how it went. When the conflict broke out, I called for a CSTO meeting. I spoke to my partners and I told them that I had to make a difficult decision. I told them I did not expect anything from them. I understood how hard it would be for them to make a decision of that sort. I said: “A lot of you have territorial issues. All of you have economic problems. The world we live in is complicated and interdependent. The decision we have made is final but that does not mean I am asking you to recognise these new republics. If you do recognise them, it will be by your own decision. If you do not, our position will not change. Now, I may be a young and liberal president but I do have some experience and I realised that I would not find many supporters after having made that admission. But that is another matter. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: You are not letting me finish. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I didn’t say we would come to an agreement. I said that, if it was not for Saakashvili, we would be able to restore our diplomatic relations and begin negotiations on any issue apart from those that we already have a position on. But we will be ready to discuss even those issues. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: We will have our differences, of course, but there will be people we would be able to negotiate with. I am sure they will be willing to negotiate, in spite of our possible disagreements. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I may say some unflattering words about Saakashvili because, unlike President Sarkozy, he does not seem like a person worthy of respect. But I could not insult the Georgian people. If the people of Georgia vote for a certain clique of people, that is a choice made by the people of Georgia. We will respect that. It would probably not have a very good effect on our relations, but we will respect the choice of the Georgian people. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Because secular authority is one thing and spiritual authority is another. In this case, the secular authorities were forced to make certain decisions in very dire circumstances. If these circumstances had not arisen, the decisions would not have been made. Talking about the spiritual authority, they work in a different sphere that I do not want to discuss in detail. It would not be reasonable if I did. I have discussed the matter with both Patriarch Kirill and Catholicos Patriarch Ilia the Second. The situation itself is not outstanding. Canonical territories are often different from state borders. For instance, Russia and Ukraine are two different countries today, but the Russian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate works in Ukraine. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Sadly, yes. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: There is no legal precondition for this as of now, but we can’t tell what the future will bring. The situation could develop in any way whatsoever. Looking at it now, I think there are no legal or de facto prerequisites for that to happen. This is the reason my executive orders called for recognition of the breakaway states as subjects of international law, nothing more. I think that it is a good way to develop neighbourly relations between Russia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It is a normal way of doing that. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: It serves to create a certain environment in South Ossetia, but I don’t know what is going to happen in 15 or 20 years. What the South Ossetian demographic will look like. How many Russian citizens South Ossetia will have, as opposed to citizens of South Ossetia. Are we going to introduce double citizenships or take some other measures? That is why I do not want to leap ahead. I would emphasise that there are currently no legal preconditions for that to happen. But life goes on and things change. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: If they ask for it — and many do, — then of course we will give them what they want. Given that they are citizens of Russia. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: We have a lot of programmes to help and support other countries. Abkhazia and South Ossetia right now may be closest to Russia in diplomatic terms. Right now these states are entirely dependent on us. They are close to us and there are Russian citizens living there. Now if we are providing aid to foreign citizens in foreign states, then of course we are going to provide to nearby independent territories with a large share of Russian citizens. This is normal. We used to help God knows who, you know. I mean, in Soviet times. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I look at it as a lawyer would. Let us forget about Saakashvili for a moment. If it is an international tribunal initiated by one or several states, supported by the international community, then there is no problem there. But if the tribunal in question is an example of voluntarism, if its purpose is to resolve a political problem by removing a leader, then I am against it. That is the difference. If an international tribunal is called to judge a leader following an international incident, then such a tribunal has the legal competence, the higher justice, if you will, to judge a head of state. But if the tribunal is only motivated by someone’s whim to change the political system of a state, I would strongly disapprove. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: If you asked for my personal opinion, I would say yes. I think what happened there was a flagrant violation of international laws. However, it would not be possible to rely on Russia’s position alone in this matter, so the creation of such a tribunal is impossible. This means the conflict will be ultimately judged by history or, in a shorter-term perspective, the voters of Georgia who will have to decide which way their country should go. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I realise that. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: That was very well put. The one thing I don’t want to do is barter for it. That would be immoral. Georgia has a position on Russia’s WTO accession. We respect that position as we respect the stance of any other sovereign state, as long as that position is in line with the goals set out in the WTO’s charter. Trade, trade preferences, customs regimes… we are ready to discuss it all. The imports of wine and mineral water? We will discuss anything. But the problem is something else. In essence, our colleagues in Georgia are trying to force on us a new edition of the political problem under the guise of WTO accession. I am referring to entry points, control over the traffic of goods, then they will want to get the EU involved… Our position on this is clear: if you want information about the traffic of goods, including transit through Abkhazia and South Ossetia, we will provide it via a modern electronic database. I have agreed to the suggestions made by the Swiss president regarding this and I recently discussed it with President Obama. We are ready to implement the model that Switzerland has proposed to us. However, if they try to change current political realities, serving it as a prerequisite for Russia’s WTO accession, we will not fall for it. WTO accession is not too high a price to pay here. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I think the chances are quite high. We have been working a lot on this. I have been motivating my colleagues in Russia and creating stimuli for it abroad, negotiating with foreign leaders. If the Georgian authorities show wisdom in this case… I think it could become a point of contact between our countries, if not quite a turning point in our relations. We could use it to re-establish trade and economic relations and after that, we may go on to our diplomatic relations. Let me remind you that we were not the ones to sever our diplomatic relations in the first place. That was initiated by Georgia. That would be good, but the ball is in their court. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I believe they are. There are some political obstacles. If these things come into play at some point, that may result in us having to go back to the initial stage of our negotiations. That would be bad for everyone, including the WTO. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I am willing to do it but the problem, as I have said, is that we have no one to negotiate with. Generally, we are open to sensible initiatives. If not from Saakashvili, we are ready to consider suggestions coming from other Georgian officials. We only recently restored air traffic and it seems to be working. We have to move towards that goal. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I do have some friends from Georgia, of course. I don’t know what they are doing now but I think the majority of them live in Russia. We studied at the legal department together. They were very nice, friendly people, we were good friends. I have only been to Abkhazia before the conflict happened. That was in 1990. I left with a somewhat grim impression. I went to Sochi and then my friend and I went on to Georgia. We drove around Abkhazia a little, looked at the sights. Then we came back and, a year later, the crisis broke out. I felt very sorry. I thought, 'what a beautiful land, with its beautiful and hospitable people. Now I can’t even go there because of what is happening.' That was how I felt about the events that started in 1995. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Let me put this plainly. No head of state has said anything about this to me. Georgia might be upset about this, but this subject is not on my agenda of negotiations with EU leaders. It is just not there. The subject was painful in 2008 because of the conflict, but now it’s off the agenda. There is one issue on it, the WTO accession, which we are discussing, mainly with the US, sometimes with EU representatives. As for the explosions, the version you mentioned is pure provocative nonsense. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I think the answer to this question is perfectly obvious. We could not recognise one territory and ignore the other. It would have been the same as saying: 'you attacked South Ossetia, we recognised them. Now attack Abkhazia and we will recognise them as well'. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I am certain of that. What’s more, South Ossetia was the 'weakest link'. It is small, sparsely populated and, perhaps, less stable. 'Let us test our strength there, and then if it works, we will try to restore constitutional order in Abkhazia,' they thought. Well, it didn't work, and that was their fatal mistake. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: You are a lucky man. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: I will try to answer this, I don’t know if I can do it like a child would but I will try. I suffer, to this day, because of what happened then. I am convinced, however, that the decision to retaliate and the recognition of the breakaway republics as subjects to international law were the right decisions to make. I believe my actions were constitutional. Not only am I unashamed of what I have done, I believe my decisions were lawful, thought-out and necessary. |
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Cached English source — passage alignment not verified Dmitry Medvedev: Perfectly understandable in a small country. |