Transcript
MFA Spokesperson Zakharova's Response on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Situation
English includes full house translations. Review is pending; untranslated passages and selected digest glosses remain labelled.
| Русский | English |
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| 1 Wave of Western Withdrawals from the Mine Ban Convention | |
| Вопрос: 20 февраля вступает в силу решение Польши о выходе из Конвенции о запрещении применения, накопления запасов, производства и передачи противопехотных мин и об их уничтожении (КЗПМ). Как Вы могли бы это прокомментировать? Ответ: Действительно, это так. Ранее в действие были приведены аналогичные решения Финляндии (10 января), а также Латвии, Литвы и Эстонии (27 декабря 2025 года). |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage Zakharova opens by confirming the factual sequence of treaty withdrawals from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines (Ottawa Treaty / КЗПМ). Poland's exit entered into force on February 20, 2026, joining Finland (January 10, 2026) and the three Baltic states — Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — whose withdrawals took effect on December 27, 2025. This coordinated timeline is presented not as coincidence but as a deliberate, synchronized pattern among NATO's eastern flank members. By enumerating all five countries with precise dates, Zakharova establishes a cumulative political narrative: that the Convention is facing a structural collapse driven by NATO-aligned states. The framing implies collective, coordinated behavior rather than independent sovereign decisions, suggesting a Brussels- or Washington-directed policy shift. The precision of dates serves a rhetorical purpose — it transforms individual national decisions into evidence of a systemic Western-led deconstruction of multilateral arms control architecture. “Earlier, similar decisions of Finland (January 10), as well as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (December 27, 2025) entered into force.” “On February 20, Poland's decision to withdraw from the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines enters into force.” |
| 2 Rejection of "National Security" Justifications | |
| Попытки упомянутых государств мотивировать предпринятые шаги «соображениями национальной безопасности», а также некоей мнимой военной угрозой со стороны России не выдерживают никакой критики. Эти инсинуации используются с одной единственной целью – для оправдания собственных деструктивных решений и ухода от ответственности. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage Zakharova categorically dismisses the national security rationale offered by withdrawing states as hollow and self-serving. She characterizes these justifications as "insinuations" deployed solely to legitimize destructive decisions and evade accountability. The word "мнимой" (imaginary/fictitious) is applied directly to the alleged Russian military threat — a pointed rhetorical move that inverts the Western security framing entirely. From Moscow's perspective, the claimed threat from Russia is a manufactured pretext, not a genuine strategic assessment. This dismissal is paired with the observation that treaty withdrawal coincides with significant military buildup by these same states along their eastern borders — i.e., near Russian territory. Zakharova uses this juxtaposition to argue that the withdrawals are aggressive rather than defensive in character, and that framing them as defensive measures is a deliberate inversion of reality designed to shift moral and legal responsibility onto Russia. “Attempts by the aforementioned states to justify the steps taken with 'national security considerations' and some imaginary military threat from Russia do not withstand any criticism.” “These insinuations are used for one single purpose — to justify their own destructive decisions and to evade responsibility.” |
| 3 Western Contempt for International Legal Obligations | |
| Выход из КЗПМ сопровождается существенным наращиванием обозначенными странами военной активности на своих восточных рубежах, в непосредственной близости от российских границ и служит наглядным примером их пренебрежительного отношения к международно-правовым обязательствам. Предусмотренные Конвенцией ограничения попросту стали неудобными и невыгодными, и от них было решено отказаться. В целом ситуация вокруг КЗПМ осложняется чередой непоследовательных шагов Украины в отношении Конвенции. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage The statement frames the withdrawals as a symptom of a deeper pathology — a systematic disregard for multilateral treaty commitments among Western states. Zakharova explicitly uses the phrase "пренебрежительного отношения к международно-правовым обязательствам" (contemptuous attitude toward international legal obligations), which elevates the mine ban issue into a broader indictment of Western legal culture. The argument is that treaty obligations are simply discarded when they become inconvenient or financially costly — "Предусмотренные Конвенцией ограничения попросту стали неудобными и невыгодными" (the Convention's restrictions simply became inconvenient and unprofitable). This frames Western behavior as fundamentally opportunistic: international law is accepted when it serves Western interests and abandoned when it does not. This is a cornerstone rhetorical move in Russia's broader diplomatic messaging, applied here specifically to arms control. “The Convention's restrictions simply became inconvenient and unprofitable, and it was decided to abandon them.” |
| 4 Ukraine's Legally Incoherent Position on the Convention | |
| Как известно, первоначально Киев намеревался выйти из данного договорного режима, о чём свидетельствует указ Зеленского № 441/2025 от 29 июня 2025 года. Однако в силу невозможности реализовать данное решение в условиях вооружённого конфликта Украина отказалась от него, направив в адрес Генерального секретаря ООН уведомление о «приостановке» участия в КЗПМ. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage A substantial portion of the statement is devoted to Ukraine's inconsistent conduct. Zakharova traces a sequence of contradictory actions: first, Zelensky's Presidential Decree No. 441/2025 of June 29, 2025, which announced Ukraine's intent to withdraw from the Ottawa Treaty; then Ukraine's reversal of that decision — attributed to the legal impossibility of formal withdrawal during active armed conflict — followed by a notification to the UN Secretary-General of a "suspension" of participation. The word "показательно" (tellingly/notably) is deployed to highlight that even other Convention member states publicly condemned Ukraine's suspension notification as unlawful and as creating a dangerous international legal precedent. By centering this internal Western critique, Zakharova strengthens the claim that Ukraine's behavior is objectively problematic — not merely from Russia's perspective, but by the standards of the Convention's own members. “Initially, Kyiv intended to withdraw from this treaty regime, as evidenced by Zelensky's Decree No. 441/2025 of June 29, 2025.” “Due to the impossibility of implementing this decision under conditions of armed conflict, Ukraine abandoned it, sending a notification to the UN Secretary-General of the 'suspension' of participation in the Ottawa Treaty.” |
| Показательно, что целый ряд государств-участников Конвенции открыто выступили против соответствующих действий Киева, охарактеризовав их как неправомерные и создающие опасный с точки зрения международного права прецедент. При этом ещё до упомянутого уведомления Украина открыто нарушала свои обязательства по КЗПМ. |
Full house translation — pending review It is indicative that a whole number of states parties to the Convention openly came out against the corresponding actions of Kyiv, describing them as unlawful and as creating a precedent dangerous from the point of view of international law. At the same time, even before the notification mentioned, Ukraine was openly violating its obligations under the KZPM. |
| 5 Ukraine's Prior Material Violations of the Convention | |
| Киев не только не уничтожил все запасы противопехотных мин (за исключением минимального количества для разработки методов обнаружения мин и обучения специалистов), хотя это предписывалось ему сделать ещё в 2010 году, но и продолжал активно применять их, в том числе против гражданских лиц и объектов. Данные факты регулярно фиксируются и документируются российскими правоохранительными структурами. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage Zakharova goes beyond procedural inconsistency to assert substantive violations by Ukraine even before any notification of withdrawal or suspension. The core accusation is twofold: Ukraine failed to destroy its anti-personnel mine stockpiles by the 2010 deadline (the Convention had required destruction by that year), and Ukraine has actively used anti-personnel mines — including against civilians and civilian infrastructure. These allegations are presented as documented facts, with Russian law enforcement agencies cited as the recording and documentation source. The framing places Ukraine in a state of long-standing, material non-compliance rather than a recent tactical shift, deepening the indictment. The 2010 deadline reference is significant: it anchors Ukraine's violations over a 15-year period, making the current conflict-era conduct appear as a continuation of chronic non-compliance rather than a war-induced exception. “Kyiv not only failed to destroy all anti-personnel mine stockpiles... although it was required to do so back in 2010, but also continued to actively use them, including against civilians and civilian objects.” “These facts are regularly recorded and documented by Russian law enforcement agencies.” |
| 6 Institutional Failure of the Convention's Enforcement Mechanisms | |
| Однако ни упомянутые нарушения Украины, ни выход ряда стран Запада из КЗПМ не получили должной реакции со стороны других её участников, в том числе в ходе 22-го совещания государств-участников Конвенции (Женева, 1-5 декабря 2025 года). Указанные обстоятельства подтверждают российские оценки слабости данного договорного режима и отсутствия у него необходимых рычагов воздействия на государства, уклоняющиеся от выполнения положений документа. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage Zakharova indicts not only individual states but the Convention's collective membership and institutional machinery for failing to respond adequately. The 22nd Meeting of States Parties (Geneva, December 1–5, 2025) is explicitly named as a forum where neither Ukraine's violations nor the Western withdrawals received appropriate reaction from participating states. This exposes what Moscow views as a structurally compromised multilateral body — one unable or unwilling to hold its own members accountable, particularly when those members are Western-aligned. The failure of the Convention's enforcement mechanisms is framed as validating Russia's long-standing skepticism about the treaty regime's effectiveness. By pointing to the December 2025 meeting as a missed opportunity for accountability, Zakharova establishes that the current crisis is the result of accumulated institutional passivity, not merely individual state behavior. “Neither Ukraine's aforementioned violations nor the withdrawal of a number of Western countries from the Ottawa Treaty received an appropriate response from its other members, including at the 22nd Meeting of States Parties (Geneva, December 1–5, 2025).” “These circumstances confirm Russia's assessments of the weakness of this treaty regime and the absence of necessary leverage over states that evade fulfillment of the document's provisions.” |
| 7 Russia's Self-Positioning as a Responsible Non-Party | |
| Россия не является участницей КЗПМ, но при этом продолжает добросовестно и в полном объёме выполнять обязательства по Дополненному протоколу II (ДП-2) и Протоколу V (П-5) Конвенции о «негуманном» оружии (КНО). В части применения мин Вооружённые Силы Российской Федерации действуют в соответствии с Наставлением по международному гуманитарному праву для ВС России. В данном документе, среди прочего, определены основные требования по применению противопехотных мин в соответствии с ДП-2 КНО. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage In a rhetorically calculated move, Zakharova positions Russia — which has never ratified the Ottawa Treaty — as more responsible in practice than the states that have formally withdrawn from it. Russia, she states, fulfills its obligations under Amended Protocol II (AP-II) and Protocol V (PV) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in good faith and in full. Furthermore, the Russian Armed Forces operate in accordance with Russia's own Manual on International Humanitarian Law, which sets requirements for anti-personnel mine use consistent with AP-II CCW. Russia's national work on mine threat prevention is reportedly reflected in regular reporting under the CCW framework. This positioning serves a dual purpose: it deflects criticism of Russian mine use by asserting IHL compliance, and it ironically contrasts Russia's conduct favorably with that of states that were formal Ottawa Treaty members. “Russia is not a party to the Ottawa Treaty, but continues to faithfully and fully fulfill its obligations under Amended Protocol II (AP-II) and Protocol V (PV) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).” “With regard to mine use, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation operate in accordance with the Manual on International Humanitarian Law for the Russian Armed Forces.” |
| 8 "Collective West" Narrative — Systemic Assault on Arms Control Architecture | |
| Результаты национальной работы по предотвращению минной угрозы регулярно отражаются в российской отчетности по КНО, её ДП-2 и П-5. Действия Латвии, Литвы, Эстонии, Польши, Финляндии и Украины полностью укладываются в курс «коллективного Запада» и его сателлитов на ревизию и подрыв международно-правовой системы в области контроля над вооружениями, разоружения и нераспространения. |
Theme summary — not a full translation of this passage The statement explicitly situates the mine ban withdrawals within Moscow's overarching geopolitical narrative: that the "Collective West" and its satellites are engaged in a deliberate, systematic revision and undermining of the international legal system governing arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation. The phrasing "ревизию и подрыв международно-правовой системы в области контроля над вооружениями, разоружения и нераспространения" is formulaic and recurring in Russian diplomatic discourse — its use here links the Ottawa Treaty episode to a much larger Moscow-defined pattern of Western behavior. By naming Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Ukraine in a single sentence under this rubric, Zakharova treats these as a unified bloc acting in concert against the multilateral arms control order rather than as individual states making independent sovereign choices. “The actions of Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Finland, and Ukraine fully fit into the course of the 'Collective West' and its satellites toward the revision and undermining of the international legal system in the field of arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation.” |
| Требуя от других строгого и неукоснительного соблюдения взятых на себя обязательств, на Западе не считают нужным придерживаться предусмотренных договорами ограничений, попутно возлагая на других вину за принятые ими решения по выходу. Последствия таких действий не заставят себя долго ждать – помимо ослабления самой Конвенции соответствующие шаги способны привести к «эффекту домино», когда примеру указанных стран последуют другие. |
Selected quote translation While demanding strict and unconditional compliance with undertaken obligations from others, the West does not consider it necessary to adhere to treaty-stipulated restrictions itself. |
| На этом фоне отдельные государства Евросоюза, обладающие развитым военно-промышленным потенциалом, уже пытаются извлечь финансовую выгоду из удовлетворения возрастающего спроса на противопехотные мины на международном рынке. Все эти обстоятельства неизбежно ведут к дальнейшей эскалации напряжённости в Европе и деградации ситуации в области региональной и международной безопасности. | English translation not available for this passage |